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STATE REGULATION OF SOCIAL
SERVICES MINISTRIES OF
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
CARL H. ESBECK*
The government is seeking to confine the "church" to only
those activities carried on in a building with a steeple on
the roof.'
The church does not have a right to wholesale dispensa-
tion from the obligation of reasonable civil laws. Christ
came to save us, not exempt us.
2
INTRODUCTION
Religiously motivated civil disobedience in the area of social
and human services ministries of religious organizations has become
increasingly widespread. With growing governmental involvement
in the lives of citizens and moves by federal and state agencies to
narrowly confine and define religious activities,3 it comes as no sur-
prise that conflict over the proper role of the state has crept as well
into the arena of social and human services conducted from religious
motivation. The current litigation and legislation is principally focused
on state regulation by certification or licensing requirements that
are expanding from health, fire, and safety concerns into the sensi-
tive areas of program and personnel.
Historical Judeo-Christian faith has long insisted that it in-
volves the full range of life's activities. Implementing the biblical im-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. Gerald Tobin, Assistant General Counsel for the United States Catholic Con-
ference.
2. Reverend Charles M. Whelan, Professor of Law, Fordham University School
of Law.
3. See, e.g., Carlson, Regulators and Religion" Caesar's Revenge, REGULATION
27 (May-June 1979); Durso and Brice, NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago: Govern-
ment Regulation Versus First Amendment Religious Freedoms, 24 ST. Louis L.J. 295
(1980); Neuberger and Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under A ttack Conflict-
ing Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229 (1979);
Comment, Bringing Christian Schools Within the Scope of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Laws: Statutory and Free Exercise Issues, 25 VILL. L. REV. 69 (1980).
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peratives found in both the Old and New Testaments to assist the
poor, the elderly, the orphaned, the widowed, and others who are
more vulnerable to the whims of fate, religious organizations have
traditionally endeavored to meet social obligations to their communi-
ty by ministries whose immediate objectives are to satisfy earthly,
human needs.
Most of these religious organizations would hasten to add that
having served as a "witness" to their faith by meeting the more im-
mediate human needs, they gain the opportunity to evangelize and
serve the spiritual needs of the same individuals. The difficulty, in-
deed, near impossibility, of defining where the temporal ends and
the spiritual begins, and regulating the former but not the latter, is
one of the most complex ongoing controversies.4
Separating the secular from the sacred, with only the latter be-
ing afforded protection under the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment, is only the threshold problem. A subset of this first question
is establishing the limits to be placed on the courts in marshalling
the evidence to make this definitional determination.' Because the
courts have been instructed to look to neutral principles of law and
objective criteria,' a ministry's organizational structure may deter-
mine the degree of protection afforded from overzealous regulation.
The types of these ministries are myriad, but the principal
ones fall within one of the following categories: (1) children's homes
and orphanages; (2) child-care, day-care, and preschool programs; (3)
foster home and adoption placement agencies; (4) charities, such as
storehouses of food and used household goods and temporary meals
and lodging; (5) alcohol and drug treatment programs; (6) counseling
and chaplaincy services; (7) youth recreational programs, camps, and
retreat centers; (8) maternity shelters for expectant unwed mothers;
(9) hospitals and medical clinics; (10) prison ministries and halfway
houses for criminals; (11) nursing and invalid homes for the elderly;
and (12) centers for the handicapped, retarded, or mentally ill.
The organizational structures of social and human services
ministries vary widely. Some are tightly integrated into a church or
synagogue with no existence apart from the body that conducts wor-
4. See text accompanying notes 145-51 infra. The theological position of
some faiths would be offended by the suggestion that life could be separated into the
religious and the secular.
5. See text accompanying notes 158-64 infra.
6. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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ship services. Others exist as lay religious groups or parachurch
organizations, often incorporated under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code,7 with operations worldwide that owe allegiance to no
particular organized denomination. The differences in organization
result from varying doctrine, structure imposed by founders, struc-
ture favored by tax considerations, state corporation law and other
positive law, and, more recently, legal advice on how to operate with
the greatest freedom from state regulation
Once it is determined that certain activity is religious, the burden
then shifts to the state to demonstrate that it has a compelling interest
that justifies limiting or prohibiting the religiously motivated
activity.' Further, the state must show that the selected means of
regulation are the least intrusive possible to achieve its stated inter-
est. Rather than carry this heavy burden, government has often
sought to define the regulated activity as "secular." This position by
the state has caused perhaps the greatest outcry among social and
human services religious organizations, for they are unable to accept
their vocation as anything less than a religious calling. The argument
of the religious organization is weakened, however, since many of the
ministries have counterparts in both the private and public sector,
often operated or funded by state or local government, seeking to
serve the same community needs.
After identifying the issues, this article surveys the litigation and
legislation regarding the social and human services activities of re-
ligious organizations, with particular focus on state licensing and regu-
latory schemes." Next, the issues are discussed within the framework
7. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1976).
8. See, e.g., R. ToMs, WHAT IS A CHURCH: THE DILEMMA OF THE PARACHURCH
(1978); Morgan, The Significance of Church Organizational Structure In Litigation And
Government Action, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 145 (1981).
9. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
10. See text accompanying notes 165-67 infra.
11. Federal, state, and local government interrelate with religious organiza-
tions in numerous ways other than comprehensive licensing and regulatory schemes.
No attempt is made here to address equal employment, unemployment compensation,
workmen's compensation, occupational health and safety, minimum wage and maximum
hours, and other labor legislation; securities regulation; tax laws; retirement and pen-
sion plan regulation; charitable solicitation laws; zoning and land use planning ordi-
nances; professional and occupational licenses; or, state corporation registration and fil-
ing requirements.
For a recent article that focuses on federal funding and concomitant regulation
of church activities in social welfare, see Pickrell & Harwich, "'Religion as an Engine of
Civil Policy"- A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State
Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 111 (1981).
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of the federal constitutional rights derived from the first and four-
teenth amendments. Finally, the article suggests an approach that ac-
commodates both legitimate state concerns and the values undergird-
ing the free exercise and establishment clauses.
I. THE MATTERS IN DISPUTE
It is helpful to think of the activities of religious organizations
falling into one of three classifications. The first classification includes
those activities that are unmistakably "secular."12 The second includes
those religious or religiously motivated activities that arguably in-
fringe upon the concerns of society. Where society has an interest, the
state is often led to step forward and police the activity. The third
classification includes those activities that even the narrowest of
"religion" definitions must embrace: worship, prayer, the reading of
sacred literature, preaching, and evangelizing. If conducted privately
or in a house of worship, these engagements enjoy as absolute a protec-
tion as our legal system can provide.
Taking the generalization a step further, most social and human
services ministries come within the second classification: those where
the state arguably should exercise its police power. The impetus
toward regulation is strengthened by two additional factors. First,
there are counterparts to the religious ministries operated by public
or private secular organizations. Accordingly, the state sees itself as
neutral when it regulates the activity similarly regardless of whether
it is operated by a secular or religious body. The mere neutrality of the
state is often asserted to constitutionally sanction its regulatory inter-
ference. 3 Second, often the very reason a religious organization is
motivated to minister to a certain community is that the people are
vulnerable and in need of help: for example, the young, the handi-
capped, or the poor. The state, for the same reason, exercises its power
to protect those who are not as able to help themselves. With both the
religious organization and the state moving to assist or protect the
same community of people, interests often collide.
12. See, e.g., De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal.
1961) (activities of winery operation by Catholic Christian Bros. was not religious and,
thus, subject to taxation); 26 U.S.C. § 511 (1976) ("unrelated business income" provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code).
13. Neutrality alone will not ensure that a regulation passes constitutional
muster. A regulation neutral on its face may offend the free exercise clause in its ap-
plication if it unduly burdens religious practice. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220
(1972).
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Challenging the power of the state to license or otherwise control
the activities of social and human services ministries primarily
raises the excessive entanglement facet of the establishment clause
and free exercise clause issues. 4 The argument against excessive en-
tanglement of the state in church affairs is that state licensing
creates an organic relationship between religion and the state. The
free exercise claim is that certain regulations unreasonably and un-
necessarily burden certain religious convictions.
Regulations promulgated by the state typically address at least
the following: (1) purposes, policies, and procedures of the organiza-
tion; (2) staff positions and responsibilities; (3) personnel qualifications;
(4) financial practices and records; (5) insurance; (6) fees or other
charges; (7) criteria or qualifications for assistance or admission; (8)
case records; (9) minimum space and personnel requirements; and, (10)
nutritional, health, building, and fire codes. No objection is raised to
compliance with reasonable nutritional, health, building code, or fire
protection requirements.1 5 However, the pervasive regulatory activity
14. Parental rights and concern for individual privacy may be implicated as
well. The parental rights theory is discussed in the text accompanying notes 240-51 in-
fra.
15. Health and safety concerns include: (1) compliance with state and local fire
and building codes; (2) health certification of staff; (3) immunization against specified
diseases; (4) fire drills and inspections; (5) compliance with food sanitation laws; (6) com-
pliance with clean water and sewage disposal laws if not serviced by a public utility;
(7) minimum standards as to available space and lavatories; (8) nutritional standards;
and (9) minimum standards as to housekeeping and maintenance of buildings and
grounds.
In State Fire Marshall v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829, 300 N.W.2d 748 (1980), the
pastor of a fundamentalist Baptist church was convicted for violations of state fire and
safety regulations in the operation of a church school. The church had purchased
modular classrooms from the local public schools and had remodeled them for use as a
church and church school. The state fire marshall cited the church for five violations.
The pastor noted extensive efforts to assure fire safety for the occupants. The pastor
further argued that he would comply with fire regulations for the building's primary
purpose as a church, and that such compliance is sufficient to cover "incidental" use as
a church school. The appeals court held that the building was a school building and
that the church school was not "incidental" to the church's ministry, but an integral
part of it. The state's compelling interest in assuring the health and safety of all school
children is sufficient to apply the school fire codes to the church school. The church's
free exercise rights were held not to be violated. The court ordered certain code viola-
tions corrected. The court noted with puzzlement that, according to the code provi-
sions, the building was "unsafe for 17 people Monday through Friday" but met the re-
quirements when 90-100 were in attendance on Sunday mornings. The court noted as
well that the record indicates that the buildings were safe when used by the Linden
School District, but were held to be unsafe when used by the church school. The court
observed, "Somehow, this logic escapes this Court. This could appear in some minds to
be harrassment of the Liberty Baptist Church."
19811
Esbeck: State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
6 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
of the state is said to create an ongoing relationship with resulting
surveillance by the state of religious concerns. Such continual supervi-
sion or organic relationship, it is argued, is contrary to establishment
clause values."6
Concerning the free exercise contentions, social ministries readi-
ly concede the power of the state to establish minimum standards
regarding the health and safety aspects of their ministries. 7 However,
16. A number of decisions have held that a law that involves the government
in the continuing surveillance of a religious institution violates the required neutrality.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615, 621 (1971) (prohibiting state parochial aid); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (taxing property of church prohibited). See
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (finding no congressional in-
tent to subject parochial schools to jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act).
17. This is especially true where the health and safety of children is con-
cerned. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), a state statute prohibiting
parents of minors from compelling their children to sell literature was held not to of-
fend the free exercise and equal protection clauses. The statute withstood attack by a
Jehovah's Witness who was the guardian of a minor sent to distribute religious
literature on public streets out of religious conviction or duty. Prince is one of the
early decisions of the Supreme Court where the state's power as parens patriae
prevailed over claims of parental rights and the religious upbringing of their children:
[Tihe family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as
against a claim of religious liberty. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (upheld polygamy as a crime notwithstanding it was a Mormon
religious tenet); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upheld crime of ad-
vocating polygamy notwithstanding it was pursuant to Mormon beliefs).
And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limita-
tion. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state
as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school at-
tendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other
ways, its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his
claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.
Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child
more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . The
catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed ap-
pellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and
religious conviction.
321 U.S. at 166-67 (footnotes omitted).
The holding in Prince v. Massachusetts was tempered in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder recognized Prince as follows:
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that paren-
tal decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a
potential for significant social burdens.
406 U.S. at 233-34. The Court went on to hold that on the record before them state
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the state encounters stiff resistance when it crosses over into areas of
Program and personnel.'8 A list of recurring areas of conflict between
social ministries and the state, that many contend burden the free
exercise of religion, is as follows:1 9
-Regulation: Requiring a written statement of a ministry's
purposes and policies and submission of character ref-
erences on behalf of the operator to obtain a license.
-Objection: Because a ministry's purposes and policies are
integrated with its religious beliefs and organizational
structure, this requirement is tantamount to a religious
test. A statement of purposes would repeatedly cite scrip-
ture and denominational documents, matters in which the
state should have little involvement. The regulation either
expresses or implies that authority lies with the state to
assess the quality and content of a ministry's program,
under the threat of licensure denial. A church or para-
church, not the state, should set the scope and limits of its
ministry. The requirement of character references or show-
ings of "good moral character" are vague, and could result in
the state sitting in judgment over a rabbi, priest or pastor.
-Regulation: Requiring a license for operation of the min-
istry.
-Objection: The ministry is not separate from the church
or parachurch organization. For the state to refuse to
license the ministry is to close down part of the church. For
the state to license the church implies that the state is
compulsory school attendance laws must yield to the religious concerns of an Amish
community that formal education beyond the eighth grade would gravely endanger if
not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
Even where children are not involved, the police power of the state to regulate
matters of concern to the health and safety of its citizens has been clearly acknow-
ledged:
Some relationship between government and religious organizations is in-
evitable. . . Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state
requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of
necessary and permissible contacts.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (citations omitted).
18. Where to draw this line of encroachment is also disputed. For example,
what constitutes "mental health" to some state officials is a matter of "religious cur-
riculum" to a faithful adherent, and what is "safety" to one is biblically mandated
discipline to another.
19. The list is not exhaustive. Indeed, such would not be possible because of
the many variances in religiously held beliefs.
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superior; whereas, one doctrinal position is that church and
state are coequals, with each assigned a separate sphere of
authority." When children are involved, the ministry is prin-
cipally responsible to the parents, not to the state.
-Regulation: Requiring professional certification of staff,
minimum education, and minimum job experience for super-
visors. Staff cannot be employed on a discriminatory basis.
-Objection: The staff are considered religious employees
serving in a lay ministry position, even though some have no
formal religious training. The staff are under the direct
supervision of the church or religious authorities, and it is
they who determine who has the gifts to minister. Because
the program or training is religious, state certification re-
quirements may conflict with the selection standards of the
religious body. To discriminate on a religious basis in staff
employment is the very essence of propogation of a parti-
cular faith.
20. The argument was rejected in Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v.
Texas, 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, reh.
denied, 439 U.S. 998 (1978); Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), see
text accompanying note 59 infra, and Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244,
607 P.2d 1102, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980), see text accompanying note 144
infra, but affirmed in Texas v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Cause No.
297,248 (200th Jud'l D. Ct.. Travis City, Tex. Jun. 30, 1981), appeal docketed, No.
13,575 (Tex. Civ. App. Sep. 4, 1981), see text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
See Dowell, Missouri Seeks to License Church PreSchool Ministries, 4 THE
CLA DEFENDER 12-13 (Iss. 3 1981), where one pastor summarized the rationale for his
opposition to licensing of child day-care facilities as follows:
1. We oppose in principle the authority of the state to license any
ministry of the church (would place the state over the church).
2. We oppose in principle the authority of the state to define
what is or is not a ministry of the church in such a way as to license one
ministry and not another.
3. We oppose licensing of church day-care because of the in-
evitable expansion to other ministries of the church affecting children
(V.B.S., camps, nurseries, etc.).
4. We oppose licensing because existing laws provide adequate
legal tools to correct any alleged cases of obvious child abuse or neglect
(if in fact such a case ever did occur in a church operated day-care).
5. We oppose licensing because of inevitable attempts of the state
to protect the child not only physically but psychologically (thus the state
would define what is psychologically harmful and potentially dictate what
could be taught in a church ministry). The church and state do not always
accept the same values or agree on what is good or bad for a child.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 1
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-Regulation: Requiring retention of case records on the in-
dividuals served and availability of the records to the state.
-Objection: The records of a church or religious organiza-
tion are confidential and protected by the clergyman-
parishioner or priest-penitent privilege."' Where children
are involved, no records should be available to the state
without permission of the parents.
-Regulation: Requiring the provision of the service with-
out discrimination; the organization is to be open to all of the
public.
-Objection: Certain organizations choose to make their
ministry available only to members of their faith, church, or
organization. The church is "called" of God to serve certain
needs, not "told" by the state. When privately funded, the
state should not be able to interfere in this decision; partici-
pation in the ministry is a privilege, not a right.
-Regulation: Requiring periodic reports and inspections.
- Objection: Health and safety matters are not objected to.
However, where the regulations address broader concerns,
then reports and inspections are resisted because they en-
force objectionable regulations.
-Regulation: Where children are involved, prohibiting cor-
poral and other means of punishment, for example, with-
holding of mail and isolation.
-Objection: In certain instances of last resort, corporal
punishment is required, but never so as to physically harm a
21. Although judicial recognition of the existence of a common law clergyman
privilege may be found in scattered decisions, the privilege was not afforded general
recognition as a common law rule, and was in fact more often denied. See Mullen v.
United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton
Rev. Ed. 1961). However, in a vast majority of jurisdictions the privilege has been
sanctioned by statute or court rules. Annot., Matters To Which The Privilege Cover-
ing Communications To Clergyman Or Spiritial Advisor Extends, 71 A.L.R.3d 794
(1976). Application of the privilege to the confidentiality of church records raises
numerous questions such as (1) does the privilege apply to entities or only natural per-
sons; (2) who is a clergyman; and (3) what type of communications is protected? See
United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973); Annot., Who Is "Clergyman" Or
The Like Entitled To Assert Privilege Attaching To Communications To Clergyman
Or Spiritial Advisors, 49 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1973).
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child. Corporal punishment in extreme cases is required by
scripture. Certain forms of discipline are used to teach the
child the consequences of improper conduct. Existing child
abuse laws are sufficient to control any excesses.
-Regulation: Requiring certain financial records and an an-
nual audit which may be inspected by the state.
-Objection: Financial records of a church or religious
organization are confidential; subject only to reasonable dis-
closure to tax authorities or, upon investigation, to law en-
forcement officials upon probable cause that a fraud or other
criminal act has been comitted. The ministry takes no public
funds, and, thus, is accountable to only its members.
-Regulation: Requiring liability insurance.
-Objection: Some religious faiths oppose insurance. In any
event, this is an intrachurch financial decision in which the
state has no compelling interest.
-Regulation: Enforcing health, safety, fire, and building
codes that are more stringent than codes applicable to the
same building when used only for a church on Sunday.
-Objection: A ministry using church facilities during the
week is just as much a church activity as the Sunday wor-
ship. If the building is safe enough for use on Sunday, it is
safe for use during the balance of the week.22
-Regulation: Instituting a state grievance investigation
and resolution procedure upon receipt of a complaint from a
parent or member of the public.
-Objection: A church or religious organization has a right
to establish and set its own procedures for resolving
disputes, at least when the complainant is a member of the
religious group.23
22. See State Fire Marshall v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829, 300 N.W.2d 748
(1980), discussed at note 15 supra.
23. Because of the variances in religious ministries, beliefs and practices,
these objections to state regulations are not summarized in any one place. Moreover,
the recitation of the claimed burden on religious exercise recorded in judicial opinions
is often not well articulated. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 33-34, 36, 44-46 infra. A
letter detailing many of these concerns written by a fundamentalist Baptist minister,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 1
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Not all of the regulations summarized above are objectionable to
every religious organization, and those objected to would not always
be opposed for the same reasons. Further, in addition to their more
direct burden on religious beliefs and practices, legislation and the
underlying regulations are often opposed because of poor draftman-
ship in this sensitive constitutional area 4 and because of the un-
necessary financial burden of compliance. 5
II. A SURVEY OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
A. The Case Law
The initial venture of the courts into the area of state licensing of
social ministries is found in the twin cases of Roloff Evangelistic
Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas28 and Oxford v. Hill. Both suits involved the
Texas Department of Public Welfare and other state officials and in-
cluded attempts to enjoin application of the Child Care Licensing Act"
in certain Christian children's homes. Although Roloff and Oxford
were decided adversely to the children's homes on the merits, facets of
Dr. David Innes, is reprinted at The Pulpit: Letter to a Senator, 3 THE CLA
DEFENDER 24-27, 29 (Iss. 9 1980). The letter comments upon the day-care licensing
regulations in California.
24. Cf. W.BALL, LITIGATION IN EDUCATION: IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM (1977). In
the context of state regulation of religious schools Mr. Ball observed:
Much of the legislation . . . has been sloppily drafted, especially at the
state level. Much of the regulatory matter-rules, regulations, guidelines,
norms, forms-is incredibly poor stuff, embracing leaking definitions, in-
ternal contradictions, resolute departures from statutory authority,
vagueness, all manner of unenforceable precatory language, and, withal,
greedy, unconstitutional over-reaching in every direction.
Id. at 10-11.
25. Again citing Ball on state licensing of religious elementary and secondary
schools:
Sometimes these regulations are common sensical, unpretentious and
worthwhile. But more and more we see the tendency in governmental
regulation to reach out to embrace every facet of the educational pro-
cess-even the non-tax-supported religious schools . . . . The multiple
"standards" are often "higher" in nothing but cost. The perfectionism of
bureaucrats appears at times as though designed to drive non-tax-
supported schools out of existence.
Pierce: The Dramatis Personae Live On, FREEDOM AND EDUCATION: PIERCE V. SOCIETY
OF SISTERS RECONSIDERED 7-8 (1978).
26. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App..1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803
(1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 998 (1978).
27. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
28. Current statutes on child-care facilities are found at TEx. HUMAN RES.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 42.001-42.076 (Vernon 1980) (formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 695a-3 (Vernon 1964)).
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this protracted litigation are still working their way through the state
courts of Texas.2
In Roloff, the Department of Public Welfare sued Roloff
Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc., seeking to require compliance with the
Child Care Licensing Act in three children's homes operated by Roloff.
Upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted the relief
requested by the department, ordering Roloff to secure licenses and to
permit inspections by departmental employees."
Because of the procedural posture of the case on appeal, the ap-
pellate court declined to reach Roloff's free exercise claims." At the
trial level, the department admitted that Roloff operated the homes
pursuant to religious convictions, and that these religious beliefs were
sincerely held.12 When requested by the trial judge to produce evi-
dence creating issues of fact for trial concerning the conflict between
the act and their religious beliefs, counsel for the homes proffered
testimony that the appeals court characterized as "nothing more than
a bald conclusion entirely unsupported by any factual evidence."33 The
thrust of the testimony by Reverend Lester Roloff and Reverend Gary
Coleman was twofold: for the ministry to accept a license from the
state implied state superiority or headship over a Christian ministry;
and compliance with state minimum standards implied an admission
that the state had a role in the upbringing of children, whereas Roloff
and Coleman admitted responsibility only to God and the parents who
placed children in the home. 4
Unable to see how these asserted conflicts, assuming they exist,
actually impaired Roloff's activities, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. In doing so, the court noted that the act was addressed solely
to the physical and mental well-being of the children involved, with
concern expressed in Section 1(b) not to encroach on areas of religious
beliefs or training:
29. The related case of Texas v. Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church,
Cause No. 297,248 (200th Jud'l D. Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. Jun. 30, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 13,575 (Tex. Civ. App. Sep. 4, 1981), is discussed at text accompanying
notes 37-39 infra. See also Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church v. Texas Dept. of
Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1980). The federal district court abstained from jurisdiction and refused to enjoin state
court proceedings. A helpful recitation of the Reverend Lester Roloff litigation is
found at 481 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
30. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
31. Id. at 858.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 857.
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It is the further legislative intent that the freedom of
religion of all citizens shall be inviolate. Nothing in this Act
shall give any governmental agency jurisdiction or authori-
ty to regulate, control, supervise, or in any way be involved
in the form, manner, or content of any religious instruction
or the curriculum of a school sponsored by a church or reli-
gious organization.3
5
As with Roloff, the Oxford case did not present a frontal conflict
between the Child Care Licensing Act and religious exercise. In Ox-
ford, the plaintiff was an employee and director of one of the children's
homes operated by Roloff. The court below dismissed the action with-
out trial, having found the act constitutional. Because of thelack of a
factual record on appeal, no coercive effect on Oxford's religious con-
duct could be cited. The court, however, apparently assumed that had
some coercion been shown, the act on its face was a proper exercise by
the state of its authority to regulate conduct, notwithstanding claims
of religiously delegated parental authority to control a child's upbring-
ing.6
The tactical error of failing to raise establishment clause con-
cerns and of failing to develope an adequate factual record was not
repeated in the recent Roloff decision of Texas v. Corpus Christi
People's Baptist Church.7 In a letter opinion filed April 17, 1981, the
trial court announced that all issues were being resolved in favor of
the children's homes and the related parties. 8 In Corpus Christi, the
Texas Department of Human Resources sought to enjoin the operation
of unlicensed religious child-care facilities and to impose civil fines. In
his letter opinion, the judge distinguishes Roloff on the basis of the
new parties and new issues. 9 The Department of Human Resources
has appealed.
35. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 42.001 (formerly TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 695a-3, § 1(b) (Vernon 1964)).
36. 558 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Numerous quotations were
lifted from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which upheld an attack on
child-labor laws in the face of a free exercise claim by a Jehovah's Witnesses parent.
See note 17 supra.
37. Cause No. 297,248 (200th Jud'l D. Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. Jun. 30, 1981), ap-
peal docketed, No. 13,575 (Tex. Civ. App. Sep. 4, 1981). Full trial on the merits was
held on Nov. 17-19, 1980 before Judge Charles Mathews of the 200th District Court in
Austin. Judge Mathews ruled against the children's ministry in Roloff.
38. Because of a pressing docket the court noted that it would not write an
opinion stating its rationale. Cause No. 297,248, letter op., p. 4 (200th Jud'l D. Ct.,
Travis Cty., Tex., Apr. 17, 1981).
39. Id. The parties included the church operating the children's home, parents
of the children, employees of the home, and some of the children served. The federal
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In the only decision on the merits involving a child day-care
center, an intermediate state appellate court in North Carolina v.
Fayetteville Street Christian School"0 upheld the authority of a state
to regulate church-operated day-care facilities for the protection of the
children's health, safety, and moral environment. 1 However, the opin-
ion is at best of merely persuasive value, since the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has vacated the opinion and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings, holding that the interlocutory appeal was im-
providently granted.42
In Fayetteville, the Child Day-Care Licensing Commission and
other state officials sued several church day-care centers and their
directors after they refused either to obtain licenses or to renew
licenses that had expired. The day-care ministries of the churches,
although refusing to be licensed, had agreed to provide the state with
evidence of their compliance with fire, health, and safety regulations.
' 3
Cross-motions were filed by the parties soon after the suit was in-
itiated. The state sought a preliminary injunction to stop operation of
the child-care centers as long as they did not have a license. The child-
care centers moved to dismiss, arguing that the licensing statutes
violated the free exercise rights of church-owned day-care facilities."
No evidentiary hearing was held. The churches filed affidavits stating
that the operation of their centers was a ministry of their churches,
that the religious and secular activities of the day-care centers were in-
divisible components, and that state licensing violated their religious
liberty. In equally bald and conclusionary assertions, the state's affi-
davits said that the Day-Care Facilities Act's requirements applied
only to health and safety, and thus did not interfere with any religious
practice or religious education. 5 The trial court denied the churches'
motion to dismiss and granted the state's request for a preliminary in-
junction. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The statute
grants to the Child Day-Care Licensing Commission the authority to
issues included the free exercise and establishment clauses, parental rights, and due
process clause rights to utilize private property for the common good. Id. at pp. 2-3.
40. 42 N.C. App. 665, 258 S.E.2d 459 (1979), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908, vacated and remanded following rehearing, 299
N.C. 731, 265 S.E.2d 387, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
41. Id. at 672, 258 S.E.2d at 463-64.
42. 299 N.C. 351, 360, 261 S.E.2d 908, 914; 299 N.C. 731, 734, 265 S.E.2d 387,
389 (1980).
43. 42 N.C. App. 665, 666, 258 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1979).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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license all day-care facilities meeting health and safety standards, con-
duct inspections and review inspection reports by other agencies, pro-
vide educational and consultation services, and promulgate regula-
tions." The health and safety standards are not determined by the
commission, but rather appear in other sections of the act, ' or are
developed by the Commission for Health Services (medical and sanita-
tion) and the State Insurance Department (fire prevention), or are
found in the North Carolina Building Code.
Other than the general allegation that their religious liberty was
abridged by the act, the only assertion of the day-care centers was the
abstract contention that the state may not require a church to obtain a
license as a condition precedent to its performing an important part of
its ministry. The court in Fayetteville rejected this assertion with
these findings:
(1) that the wording of the Act in question does not grant to
the State any authority to interfere with the religious belief
or freedom of defendants; (2) that the day care licensing re-
quirements speak only to minimum standards of health and
safety and do not interfere with any religious practices or
contain any educational requirements for staff or children;
(3) that all of the defendants have heretofore been licensed
by the Commission without any objections; and (4) that de-
fendants do not contend or show that it is contrary to their
sincere religious belief to seek licenses.4 1
Because the case has now been remanded to the trial court,
presumably for a full trial on the merits, these findings may no longer
be supported once an evidentiary record is fully developed. However,
it is interesting to contemplate the implications of these findings. For
example, would the act be unconstitutional if it went beyond health
and safety requirements, and delved into specifying the educational re-
quirements of staff or setting minimum requirements for the program
content of a child-care center? Presumably so, or at least in the opinion
of the Fayetteville court a serious free exercise defense would be rais-
ed that could not be summarily dismissed. 9
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-88 (1978).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.1 (qualifications of staff), § 110-91(6)
(space requirements), § 110-91(7) (staff-child ratio), and § 110-91(9) (record keeping)
(1978).
48. 42 N.C. App. 665, 670-71, 258 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1979).
49. In another case concerning a church day-care center, a state trial court
held that a separately incorporated church-operated child-care center did not require a
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The court held that the mere requirement that a church obtain a
license, without more, before proceeding with its ministry, does not
rise to a free exercise violation. Roloff and Oxford are in accord.
Moreover, all three courts-Fayetteville, Roloff, and Oxford-were
unmoved by the argument that state licensure of a church ministry
may affect that church's autonomy." At this juncture only Corpus
Christi is to the contrary."'
Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc."2 is the only reported appellate
case to be decided with the benefit of a full trial record. In Heart
Ministries, the state sued a nonprofit religious corporation, Heart
Ministries, Inc., and its principal operators, Reverend and Mrs. Cowell.
The activities of Heart Ministries challenged by the state were: (1) act-
ing as a child-placement agency;" (2) acting as a foster home;54 (3)
preparing to operate a children's home;55 (4) acting as a home for unwed
mothers and placing the newborns for adoption;56 and (5) bringing
children into the state for placement in foster homes. 7 All of the above
activities required approval and licensure by the state, 8 which the
Cowells refused out of religious conviction.
Heart Ministries operated the Victory Village Home for Girls. At
the time of trial, the children's home consisted of thirteen girls placed
with Heart Ministries by their parents or guardians. They were housed
in private homes, with four of the girls residing with the Cowells. A
large dormitory was under construction on a 117 acre site. The
children had come from Kansas and several surrounding states.
Some of the girls were pregnant and unmarried. 9
The Victory Village Home for Girls was only one aspect of
Heart Ministries. Other ministries included a church, of which Rev-
special use permit under city zoning ordinances. The day-care center was found to be
"religious activity" within the terms of the zoning ordinance with which the church
already was in compliance. Further, day care was held to be religious activity pro-
tected by the first amendment. Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d
978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1970).
50. See text accompanying note 20 supra and notes 144, 170-74 infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
52. 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980).
53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-503 (1980).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-502 (1980).
57. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
38-1202 (Supp. 1980).
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-504 (1980). Failure to obtain the required license is
punishable as a misdemeanor. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-514 (1980).
59. 227 Kan. 244, 245-49, 607 P.2d 1102, 1104-06 (1980).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/1
SOCIAL SER VICES MINISTRIES
erend Cowell was pastor, a nonaccredited school with grades one
through eight that used the Accelerated Christian Education sys-
tem, counseling of the girls and others, evangelism, and a radio
ministry.6"
Under the statutory scheme, considerable discretion to pro-
mulgate regulations to "promote the health, safety and welfare of
the residents" is delegated to the Secretary of Health and Environ-
ment, with the cooperation of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilita-
tion Services." The state officers apparently so fully exercised their
directive to issue regulations that the court did not attempt to sum-
marize the great bulk of them. Only the regulations concerning
residential children's homes accommodating more than four children
were discussed.62 Despite violations having been charged, the court
did not explain why the regulations of child-placement agencies,
foster homes, and maternity homes were not discussed. 3
The regulations concerning residential children's homes mixed
health and safety concerns with the more troublesome area of pro-
gram and personnel. Those falling in the latter area required: (1) a
written proposal detailing the purpose of the home and the adminis-
tration, financing, staffing, and services to be offered; (2) a govern-
ing board of at least six members representing a variety of com-
munity interests; (3) an annual financial statement to be filed with
the state; (4) an annual audit by a public accountant; (5) minimum
staff qualifications; and (6) the prohibition of certain kinds of
discipline, including corporal punishment.
The state supreme court assumed the correctness of the trial
court's finding that the religious convictions of the Reverend Cowell
and others employed at Heart Ministries were sincerely held, and
that compliance with the state licensure statutes and regulations
would violate their religious convictions. 5 Apparently, the supreme
court believed it unnecessary to test the assertions of Reverend
Cowell that the regulations violated his religious convictions as
follows: (1) corporal punishment was required by scripture; (2) financial
disclosure and audits were not necessary, since he believed that God
will provide; (3) budgets and pledges were inconsistent with his faith;
(4) disclosure to the state of a child's records was a breach of ethics;
60. Id. at 247, 250-51, 607 P.2d at 1105, 1107.
61. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-508 (1980).
62. 227 Kan. at 248-49, 607 P.2d at 1106.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 254, 607 P.2d at 1109.
19811
Esbeck: State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
18 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.16
and (5) he interpreted the regulations to prohibit evangelism of the
children, a duty which was biblically imposed."6
In its discussion of the law, the court in Heart Ministries deter-
mined initially that, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state had
a legitimate and vital interest in protecting minor children within its
jurisdiction,67 presumably satisfying the compelling state interest test
of Sherbert v. Verner. 8 Next, the court ventured into a discussion of a
series of United States Supreme Court cases primarily addressing the
dissemination of religious ideas and invoking principally the free
speech aspect of the first amendment.6 9
The court offered no treatment of the burden on free exercise,
direct or incidental, suffered by Reverend Cowell and other employ-
ees, as Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder" require. Nor did the court
discuss whether the state's interests related to some substantial
threat to public safety, peace, or order, thus warranting the burden.
Instead, having already acknowledged that compliance with the regu-
lations would violate the defendants' religious convictions, the court
inexplicably characterized the operation of a children's home as "usual-
ly a secular activity." 1 Moreover, the court went on to diminish the
compelling state interest test to a mere "balancing process" between
valid state interests and free exercise rights."
Nowhere in Heart Ministries did the court consider whether the
same vital state interest in the protection of minor children away from
parental oversight could be satisfied by less intrusive means. For ex-
ample, the court stated that absent the licensing procedure, the state
officials lack the knowledge required to protect the children from
harm." Could the same goal not be achieved by less onerous regula-
tions? Clearly some formal reporting requirement by children's homes,
stopping short of the pervasive regulations of program and personnel,
would meet the state's concern as parens patriae."4
In the only case dealing with first amendment challenges to state
regulation of social and human services ministries filed in a federal
66. Id. at 250, 607 P.2d at 1107.
67. Id. at 253, 607 P.2d at 1109.
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
69. 227 Kan. at 253-56, 607 P.2d at 1109-11. The cases discussed were Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
70. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
71. 227 Kan. at 256, 607 P.2d at 1111.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 257, 607 P.2d at 1111-12.
74. See text accompanying notes 255-59 infra.
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court, the South Carolina Child Welfare Agencies Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder were found to be unconstitutional when ap-
plied to a church-operated children's home. The lawsuit, Tabernacle
Baptist Church v. Conrad," was brought by the church seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Social Ser-
vices, administering the Child Welfare Agencies Act,"8 and the
Children's Foster Care Review Board, charged with the duty of
reviewing and coordinating the activities of local foster care review
boards."
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted
the two motions in part, and made findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The church was found to be an unincorporated religious associa-
tion, which, as part of its ministry, operated a home for neglected and
disadvantaged children. An integral part of the home's program was
that the children received fundamentalist Christian training and
discipline."8 The home did not object to compliance with the local fire
and health regulations or to inspection by the department. 9
The Child Welfare Agencies Act authorizes broad departmental
discretion to make and enforce regulations relating to the licensing of
child care agencies "as may be necessary to carry out the purposes" of
the act.8" In furtherance of this delegated authority, the department
promulgated rules which: (1) required licensing of children's homes; (2)
set minimum standards for the homes, including that a home's pro-
gram be "well rounded" with "appropriate community activities"
available; (3) required a home to submit a report which "clearly defined
and explained" its purpose and that it met a "demonstrated need"; and
(4) allowed inspection by the department. 1
The federal district court nullified the act and implementing
regulations as applied to the religious children's home. In so doing, the
court noted that a more tightly drawn statutory scheme might have
been acceptable:
Although of the opinion that the application of a licens-
ing provision setting forth certain well-defined health and
safety standards and containing a proviso prohibiting the
licensing authority from interfering with the Home's reli-
75. C/A No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 28, 1980).
76. S.C. CODE §§ 43-15-10 to 43-15-90 (1976).
77. S.C. CODE §§ 43-13-10 to 43-13-80 (1976 Supp. 1980).
78. C/A No. 79-149, slip op. at 6 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
79. Id. at 4.
80. S.C. CODE § 43-15-30 (1976).
81. C/A No. 79-149, slip op. at 3, 6 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
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gious beliefs or practices would be within the State's power
• . . the licensing scheme under consideration is not so
limited.
[The regulations are] replete with broadly phrased provi-
sions giving [the department] virtually unlimited discretion
in assessing compliance with its mandates. For example, if
the [departmental] representative assigned to visit the
Home was to determine that its program of care was not suf-
ficiently "well rounded," or that "appropriate community ac-
tivities" had not been made available, a license could be
denied, despite the fact that what the [departmental] repre-
sentative considered a well rounded program of care of ap-
propriate community activities would fly in the face of the
[church's] religious beliefs.2
Although finding no present impermissible burden on free exercise
values, the court's opinion is properly interpreted as reading the
regulatory scheme to be so vague that it is void when dealing with sen-
sitive constitutional rights.
In a second memorandum filed the following day, the court
upheld the act establishing the Foster Care Review Board.83 The act
defines "foster care" broadly enough to include the church's children's
home operation. ' The act gives local foster care review boards with
weighty powers of persuasion over the church operated home, but
grants no authority that must be obeyed.85 Accordingly, the court con-
82. Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). The quoted language permits a well-defined
licensing scheme of limited scope. Accordingly, this dicta may well be utilized to sup-
port the state's position in such cases as Corpus Christi, discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 37-39 supra.
83. C/A No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 1980).
84. S.C. CODE § 43-13-80 (Supp. 1980).
85. S.C. CODE § 43-13-40 (1976) reads as follows:
The functions and powers of the local review boards shall be as
follows:
(1) To review every six months cases of children who have resided
in public or private foster care for a period of more than six months to
determine what efforts have been made by the supervising agency or
child caring institution to acquire a permanent home for such child.
(2) To encourage and facilitate the return of all such children to
their natural parents or, upon a determination that such return is not in
the best interest of the child, to initiate such procedures pursuant to law
as would make the child eligible for adoption or direct the appropriate
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cluded that the plaintiff had failed to show that the mere advisory or
persuasive powers of the local review boards violated the first amend-
ment religion clauses.
Because the church failed to raise a question of fact on the issue of
coercion by the review board which affected the home's religious
freedom, it is understandable that the court would grant the state's
motion concerning the free exercise clause. The failure of the court to
hear further evidence on the establishment clause claim is not so easily
understood. The contention was summarily brushed aside with the
conclusion that the legislation "lacks any capacity to foster excessive
government entanglement with religion."8 The statutory functions of
the local foster care review boards suggest that a contrary conclusion
is probable, depending on how zealously a given board pursues its man-
date. It is easy to imagine how a local board armed with a statutory
directive to "review," "encourage," "facilitate," "promote," "direct,"
and "report" could get inextricably involved with the religious train-
ing and policies of a church-operated home.
Michigan Department of Social Services v. Emmanual Baptist
Pre-School7 is the most recent of cases to be filed concerning state
licensure of a social ministry. The case follows the now-familiar pat-
tern of seeking to close a church-operated day-care center for refusal
to apply for a state license. The state Child Care Organizations Act 8
agency to take such action followed by a maximum effort to place the
child adoptively.
(3) To promote and encourage all agencies and institutions involved
in placing children in foster care to place children with persons both
suitable and eligible as adoptive parents.
(4) To advise foster parents of their right to petition the ap-
propriate court for the termination of parental rights and the right of
adoption for any child who has been in their care for a period of more
than six months and to encourage such foster parents to initiate such pro-
ceedings in an appropriate case.
(5) To direct a child-caring institution or agency and exert all possi-
ble efforts to make arrangements for permanent foster care or guardian-
ship for children for whom return to natural parents or adoption is deter-
mined to be unfeasible or impossible.
(6) To report to the State office of the Department of Social Ser-
vices and other adoptive or foster care agencies and institutions deficien-
cies in such agencies' efforts to secure permanent homes for children
discovered in the board's review of such cases as provided for in item (1)
of this section.
86. C/A No. 79-149, slip op. at 3 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 1980).
87. No. 80-24984-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty., Apr. 1, 1981).
88. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.111-722.128 (Supp. 1981).
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was recently amended to remove any doubt that it was intended to in-
clude the regulation of organizations with the primary function of
religious education. With any statutory ambiguity removed, the de-
partment moved for summary judgment asserting that no valid
defenses had been interposed by the church preschool. The court
denied the state's motion finding that the first amendment defenses
asserted by the church preschool raised genuine questions of fact for
fuller development at trial.89 The affirmative defenses of the church
preschool raised both free exercise values and the excessive entangle-
ment facet of the establishment clause.
The court noted two free exercise issues raised by -the pre-
school that needed factual development. First, an administrative
rule requires that a licensed preschool employ a program director
that has completed a minimum number of semester hours at an "ac-
credited college or university." Because the church selected its staff
from certain schools, many of which reject state accreditation on
biblical grounds, the regulation had the potential to burden religious
exercise in the selection of staff that the church deemed suitable.
Second, provisions of the Child Care Organizations Act are suffi-
ciently broad to empower the state to arbitrarily and capriciously
deny the church preschool the right to propogate its religious views. 1
For example, the court quoted a section of the act that grants con-
siderable authority and discretion to the department to deny or revoke
a license:
If satisfied as to the need for a child organization, its finan-
cial stability, the good moral character of the applicant, and
that the services and facilities are conducive to the welfare
of the children the license shall be issued or renewed.92
Referring to the excessive administrative entanglement defense
under the establishment clause, the court observed the possibility of
surveillance and pervasive monitoring of church affairs, especially the
authority to inspect and evaluate church financial records. 3 Holding
that all of the defenses raised genuine issues of material fact under
both free exercise and establishment clause jurisprudence, the court
denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In anticipation of a
89. No. 80-24984-CZ, slip. op. at 3-4 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty., Apr. 1, 1981).
90. Id., slip. op. at 3-4.
91. Id., slip. op. at 5-6.
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.115(1) (Supp. 1981).
93. No. 80-24984-CZ, slip. op. at 4-5 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Ingham Cty., Apr. 1, 1981).
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.112(3) (c) (Supp. 1981).
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well-presented defense at trial, the Emmanuel Baptist Pre-School case
should be carefully watched.
In a decision characterized as "strange, shocking, unprece-
dented"94 by W. Stanley Mooneyham, President of World Vision Inter-
national," a California-based Christian foster and adoptive home place-
ment agency lost the right to place children exclusively with families
who were active members of an evangelical Protestant church. Scott v.
Family Ministries" involved twenty orphans air-lifted from Cambodia
on the eve of its fall to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 and brought to
the state-licensed Family Ministries in California for adoptive place-
ment. When the children first arrived in the United States, one of the
attending physicians was Dr. Richard Scott. Dr. Scott inquired of
Family Ministries about adopting one of the children, but was told that
he and his wife were ineligible because they were not members of an
evangelical Protestant church. Dr. and Mrs. Scott sued, seeking to
adopt one of the children and to enjoin Family Ministries from enforc-
ing its religious eligibility requirement in selecting adoptive homes for
any of the twenty children.9"
The trial court required that the state Department of Health be
notified as a party in interest having jurisdiction over adoptive place-
ment. However, the department made it clear that it took no position
in the matter. Following trial on the merits the lower court found for
the Scotts and granted the requested injunction against Family Minis-
tries.
94. Phillips, Babylift: Just Look At You Now, 32 ETERNITY 25 (No. 3 1981).
Dr. Mooneyham's entire statement was:
I risked my life to save those babies from certain death, and I'm not going
to remain silent and simply let them be "kidnapped" by the State of
California or anyone else. . . . The decision is strange, shocking, un-
precedented. If allowed to stand, no religious agency will ever be able
safely to bring orphaned children into California for adoptive placement.
95. World Vision International is a nonprofit interdenominational Christian
corporation conducting global wide relief services to third world countries.
96. 65 Cal. App. 3rd 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976). World Vision sued in
federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against all the parties to
the state suit. World Vision International v. The Superior Court of the State of
California, Case No. CV-75-3776 I H (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 11, 1975). World Vision
sought to protect its interests in the children which it had brought to the United
States and which had been surrendered to Family Ministries only because World Vi-
sion did not hold a license in California to be an adoptive placement agency. The
federal district court abstained from interfering in the state's handling of the matter
and dismissed the suit.
97. Id. at 499, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
98. Id. at 500, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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On appeal the judgment was affirmed. California law, like that of
most states, embodies religious matching preferences in adoptive
placement. Religious matching requires or prefers adoption by parents
of the same religious faith as that of the natural parents of the child or
of a religion for which the natural parents express a preference.99 This
policy arose out of the common law right of a natural parent to control
the religious upbringing of his child. ' ° The state remains neutral in
this religious matter by simply honoring the desires of the natural
parent.
The appellate court ventured farther than ever before in declar-
ing that the state licensing scheme over private adoptive agencies
made the actions of private agencies also "state action in the context of
the establishment clauses."' '1 Thus, it reasoned, if the state must be
neutral in matters of religion, so must private agencies such as Family
Ministries! The case is ill-considered because it confuses "state action"
for purposes of the fourteenth amendment due process clause 2 with
that which is impermissible state sponsorship of religion or non-
neutrality toward religion for purposes of the establishment clause of
the first amendment.'013 The implications are far reaching. Family
99. As the court noted, about 95 percent of the population of Cambodia is
Buddhist. However, at the time when World Vision took custody of the children con-
cerned, the parents, if available, were told that the baby might be placed for adoption
in a Christian home and were asked to sign a written "relinquishment." Id. at 498, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 433.
100. Id. at 505, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
101. Id. at 506, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
102. State action exists for purposes of the fourteenth amendment where the
state and a private party or entity maintain a sufficiently interdependent or symbolic
relationship (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); where the state
requires, encourages or is otherwise significantly involved in nominally private conduct
(Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)); and where the private person or entity ex-
ercises a traditional state function (Smith v. Allwright, 319 U.S. 738 (1943) and Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
103. Although it can be hoped that Scott v. Family Ministries will be given a
quick burial, the story for the twenty children has a happier ending. In return for not
appealing the decisions to a higher court, the Los Angeles County Department of
Adoptions approved the adoptions of the children by the families chosen by Family
Ministries. Phillips, Babylift: Just Look at You Now, 32 ETERNITY 25-26 (No. 3 1981).
Protracted litigation concerning a state foster care funding statute is reported
at Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Wilder I) and Wilder v.
Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Wilder II). The State of New York passed
an act providing for public assistance to private foster care. The act provided for
religious matching in the placement of children in foster homes. In Wilder I the plain-
tiffs challenged the religious matching provisions as having the effect of religious and
racial discrimination. The theory of religious and racial discrimination in the act's ap-
plication was that in New York City the number of Protestant, black children needing
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Ministries exists for the very purpose of discriminating in favor of its
particular religious persuasion, as do other adoptive agencies spon-
sored by other faiths. What about the free exercise and establishment
clause rights of Family Ministries, its employees and sponsoring
churches? The court of appeals makes no mention of having considered
these rights."°4
Should the holding of Scott be followed elsewhere and applied to
state-licensed or certified social and human services religious minis-
tries, then their religious activities and underlying motivations will be
hopelessly frustrated. Not only could a ministry not discriminate on a
religious basis in defining the community it sought to serve, but the
further aim of evangelization and spiritual counseling after immediate
physical needs are met would be prohibited altogether.
No decisions concerning comprehensive state regulatory
schemes have been reported that have allegedly burdened the reli-
gious activities of charities,"°5  counseling and chaplaincy serv-
placement far exceeds the number of openings in Protestant agencies. This is not the
case with Roman Catholic and Jewish children needing placement. The result is that a
disproportionate number of Protestant, black children must go to public shelters and
state training schools that are "grossly inadequate." The court in Wilder I, limiting its
consideration to the single issue of whether the religious matching provision of the act
facially violates the establishment clause, held that it did not.
In Wilder II the plaintiffs have amended the complaint to also allege claims of
favoring religion over "non-religion" and the funding of religious organizations as con-
trary to the free exercise and establishment clauses. The amendments were found by
the court to state a claim. The matter has not yet been tried on the claims in the
amended complaint.
104. The court did dispose of the claim by Family Ministries that it stands in
the relationship of loco parentis and thus expresses a religious preference on behalf of
the natural parents. Under state law an adoptive agency to which a child has been
released does not thereby acquire all the rights of a natural parent. 65 Cal. App. 3d at
507, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
105. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the considerable litigation
over the application of charitable solicitation statutes and ordinances to religious
groups. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 637 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1981), prob. jur. noted,
__ U.S. -, 49 U.S.L.W. 3893 (Jun. 1, 1981). Athough having a possible incidental
effect on the social and human service activities of a religious organization, the thrust
of the challenged laws is toward fund raising endeavors and fiscal accountability.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976),
has affected the employment practices of charities. In McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972), the court declined to apply Title
VII to the employment relationship between a church and one of its ministers.
However, in EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal.
1979), the court found that first amendment considerations did not preclude the ap-
plication of Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination against a religious publishing
house by a clerical employee. See also EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
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ices,' nursing and invalid homes; °7 alcohol and drug treatment pro-
grams; hospitals and medical clinics; s halfway houses and other
Seminary, __ F.2d _ (5th Cir. 1981); Mississippi College v. EEOC, 626 F.2d 477
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-1703, 49 U.S.L.W. 3969 (1981).
A ministry that collected used goods, refurbished them, and then sold the items
to raise money to assist the poor and to propagate its faith was held subject to a city
ordinance requiring all secondhand and junk dealers to obtain permits. Gospel Army v.
City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945). The governmental interest
was the prevention of secondhand dealers "fencing" stolen goods.
106. A police chaplaincy program provided to a city by a local church was held
to violate the establishment clause in Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588
(W.D.N.C. 1980).
The court in In re Bartha, 63 Cal. App. 3d 584, 134 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1976), upheld
the conviction of a woman prosecuted under a city ordinance prohibiting fortunetelling
as a business. The ordinance did not prohibit the exercise of the defendant's religion of
witchcraft, because the tenets of her religion did not require that she practice fortune-
telling for a fee. See Annot., Regulation of Astrology, Clairvoyancy, Fortunetelling,
and the Like, 91 A.L.R.3d 766 (1979).
107. In Mid American Health Serv., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 103 L.R.R.M.
1234 (1980), the National Labor Relations Board determined that it had jurisdiction
over an extended-care nursing home owned and operated by the Seventh-Day Adven-
tist Church. The Board declined to reach the first amendment defenses asserted by the
church, stating that any final determination of the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act would have to come from the courts.
Despite vigorous protest from the unincorporated associations of churches, the
court in Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979), reh. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980), held that the association
of churches could be sued along with a retirement home which it promoted with its
name under the legal theory of alter ego or agency. The claims were by present and
former residents of the home and alleged fraud, breach of contract, and statutory
violations. Following this decision, the suit was settled for twenty-one million dollars
by the United Methodist Church. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 29, 1980, at 10.
108. The right of Roman Catholic hospitals to refuse patients who requested
abortions and sterilization operations has been vindicated. Taylor v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d
308 (9th Cir. 1974); see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973); Doe v. Bellin
Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F.
Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), appeal dismissed, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974); Watkins v.
Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).
A state attorney general's authority existing under a state statute to supervise
the activities of a nonprofit, charitable hospital were upheld in Queen of Angels Hosp.
v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 339, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977). However, the hospital,
operated by a Roman Catholic order, was protected from interference by the attorney
general in controversies over the hospital's operation that involve religious doctrine or
practice.
Compare Wisconsin Health Facilities Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 280
N.W.2d 773 (1979), wherein a Roman Catholic hospital successfully proved that its
operation is not so religiously pervasive that state aid in the form of tax exempt bond-
ing authority does not run afoul of the establishment clause, with St. Elizabeth Com-
munity Hosp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980), wherein a Roman Catholic
hospital is resisting the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over its
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prisoner ministries;"9 and youth recreational programs; camps and
retreats."'
B. Legislative Developments
Recent legislation has recognized the difficult first amendment
issues involved when the state seeks to regulate religious ministries
and has sought to accommodate these concerns while still protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. The legislation has been
solely in the area of child-care and child-welfare activities. The
statutory schemes have taken two approaches. Indiana,"' Virginia,"'
Louisiana,"' South Carolina,"' and Alabama"5 have eliminated licens-
ing requirements and the accompanying battery of regulations for cer-
tain religious organizations, and have substituted a registration and
notice provision with specified limited authority retained by the state
to inspect the ministry's activites. New Mexico"6 and Texas 017 have
written into their statutes a general statement that the act and regula-
tions promulgated thereto are not to burden the exercise of religious
beliefs or activities except where the safety or health of the children is
endangered.
The comprehensive child-welfare acts of Indiana, Virginia, Loui-
siana, and Alabama have by later, separate legislation carved out
employees on religious freedom grounds.
109. Although no litigation has been reported concerning private ministries to
prisoners, in the face of an establishment clause challenge the court in Rudd v. Ray,
248 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1976), upheld the expenditure of public funds to provide
chaplains and religious facilities at prisons as a proper accommodation .of a prisoner's
free exercise rights.
110. Zoning and land use controls have been held to be a sufficient public in-
terest to deny special use permits to retreat centers and youth camps. See Holy Spirit
Ass'n v. Town of New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Christian Retreat
Center v. Board of Cty. Comm., 28 Or. App. 673, 560 P.2d 1100 (1977).
In Kollasch v. Adamany, 99 Wis. 2d 533, 299 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, - Wis. -, - N.W.2d - , No. 79-1579 (Dec. 1, 1981), fees col-
lected for meals served at a retreat center operated by a monastic community of
Roman Catholic sisters were held to be subject to a state sales tax. Although finding
that the serving of meals to their guests was a religious activity, the appellate court
said that the sales tax was neither a tax on religion nor a burden to their exercise of
religion.
111. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7 (Burns 1981).
112. VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3 (1980).
113. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404 (West Supp. 1981).
114. S.C. CODE §§ 43-35-710 to 43-35-780 (Supp. 1980).
115. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981).
116. Child Placement Agency Licensing Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7A-1 to
40-7A-8 (Supp. 1981).
117. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 42.001 (Vernon 1980).
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special exemptions to accommodate religious ministries operating in
the child-welfare field. The South Carolina act was entirely rewritten
with a separate article dealing with day-care centers operated by
religious groups. The exemptions in Indiana, Virginia, South Carolina
and Alabama apply only to child day-care centers,"8 whereas Louisiana
has exempted not only day care, but children's group-care homes,
maternity homes and child agencies for foster-home or adoptive home
placement.11 The special exemption applies to a "religious organiza-
tion" in Indiana"2 ° and to a "religious institution" under the Virginia
act.12' The Alabama exemption attempts greater precision by applying
only to preschool programs that are an integral part of a local church
ministry or a religious nonprofit elementary school. These preschool
programs must be recognized in the church's or school's documents,
whether operated separately or as a part of a religious nonprofit
elementary school unit, secondary school unit, or institution of higher
learning under the governing board or authority of the local church or
its convention, association, or regional body to which it may be
subject.122
Perhaps desiring not to favor sectarian organizations over
private, secular child-welfare agencies, the Louisiana legislation ex-
118. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7(a) (Burns 1981); VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3A (1980);
ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404(A) (West Supp. 1981).
120. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7(a) (Burns 1981). The statute further defines a
"religious organization" as one "exempt from Federal income taxation under Section
501 of the Internal Revenue Code." No doubt this is a short hand attempt to define
"religion," a difficult and perilous task. See Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Insti-
tutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313 (1980); Note, Toward
a Consitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). However, simply
referring to § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976), is no
solution. The Internal Revenue Service is perhaps more confused about the issue than
others. See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Prob-
lem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977).
121. VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(A) (1980). A "religious institution" must either have
"tax exempt status as a nonprofit religious institution in accordance with § 501(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954" or that the "real property owned and exclusively
occupied by the religious institution is exempt from local taxation." The Virginia ex-
emption recognizes that many independent or nondenominational churches do not ob-
tain a § 501(c)(3) exemption from the Internal Revenue Service. However, they general-
ly do claim a local property tax exemption.
122. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981). As is the case with the Indiana and
Virginia legislation, this exemption language is vague and difficult to apply in the
borderline case. For example, what elements must be present for a preschool to be an
"integral part" of a church or school beyond the bare recognition of such status in the
organizational documents?
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empts an agency "if it receives no state or federal funds."'23 Because of
the availability of public funds for child-care programs under federal
social legislation'24 and similar acts in many states, few private child-
welfare agencies would qualify under the Louisiana exemption other
than centers operated by religious organizations. However, some reli-
gious centers accept public funds and thus would not be exempt. The
constitutionality of such public funding is presently being challenged
under the establishment clause.' 5
The exemption provision is more appropriately drawn in the
Louisiana legislation. If a child-care agency is so "pervasively
religious""'2 that it is prohibited from receiving public support consis-
tent with the establishment clause, then the agency should be free
from state regulation of its program and personnel consistent with
free exercise values. The reverse is also true. If a child-care center is
so "secular" that its financial support by taxpayers is permissible,
although operated by a church or religious organization, it is fair that
it should comply with many of the same state regulatory concerns as
do private nonsectarian agencies.
Under all five statutes the states retain an interest in the
religiously-operated child-care activity by requiring compliance as
follows:
1. The agency must give written notice to the state that it is in
operation.'
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404(A)(2) (West Supp. 1981). Cf. S.C. § 43-35-710
(Supp. 1980), which is a mixture of these two exemption provisions. It provides for
registration only if the day-care facility is a "local church congregation or established
religious denomination ... which does not receive state or federal financial assistance."
124. See, e.g., The Child Nutrition Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-688 (1976). The act
applies to private preschool programs and residential child-care institutions such as or-
phanages. Id. at § 1784(c). Religious centers can receive benefits if tax exempt under
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). Other examples of federal social welfare legislation in which
religious organizations may participate and receive public funds are cited in Pickrell &
Horwich, "Religion as an Engine of Civil Policy'" A Comment on the First Amend-
ment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, 44 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 111, 113 n.16 (1981).
125. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed in
note 103 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 260-66 infra.
127. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7(c) (Burns 1981), requires registration with the
state Board of Health and state Fire Marshall. VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(A) (1980), requires
filing with the state Commissioner of Welfare. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404F (West
Supp. 1981), requires registration with the Department of Health and. Human
Resources. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981) requires filing a notice with the Depart-
ment of Pensions and Security. S.C. CODE § 43-35-720 (Supp. 1980), requires giving
notice to the Department of Social Services.
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2. The agency must comply with applicable building, fire and
sanitation codes, allow inspection by officials to determine compliance,
and submit proof of the results of these inspections.12
3. Indiana, Virginia and Alabama require written notice of the
agency's unlicensed status to the public and parents and require fur-
nishing information concerning its facilities."
4. Virginia sets a minimum ratio of employees to children.3 '
5. Virginia and Louisiana provide a procedure whereby a citizen
can lodge a complaint with a public official that will.investigate. T'
6. Any agency not in compliance may be enjoined from
operating and/or be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.'32
The Virginia legislation has already come under attack by
operators of secular day-care centers on equal protection and estab-
lishment clause grounds."3 The merits of the claims were not reached,
however, because the court found that since the injury was
speculative, the plaintiffs lacked standing.'34
The statutory and regulatory approaches by the states of Texas" 5
and New Mexico"' provide no exemption from licensure for child-care
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7(f) (Burns 1981); VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(A)(2)
(1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404A, E and F (West Supp. 1981); ALA. CODE § 38-7-3
(Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 43-35-720 (Supp. 1980).
129. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7(f) and (g) (Burns 1981); VA. CODE §
63.1-196.3(A)(4) (1980); ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981).
130. VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(A)(3) (1980).
131. VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(C) (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404B, C and D
(West Supp. 1981).
132. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-3-2-12.7(h), 12-3-2-15 (Burns 1981); VA. CODE §
63.1-196.3(C) (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404F (West Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE §§
43-35-730, 43-35-780 (Supp. 1980).
133. Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard, 480 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.
Va. 1979), and Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard, 487 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D.
Va. 1980), vacated and remanded without opinion, 642 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1981). These
are separate actions involving the same parties. The equal protection argument alleged
that the legislation gave the religious day-care centers a "significant competitive ad-
vantage." The court characterized the establishment clause claim as "a serious charge
and a serious concern." 480 F. Supp at 640. Nevertheless, the court found that the
alleged economic loss was central to the plaintiffs' claims, not the entanglement of the
state in religious matters. Id.
134. 480 F. Supp. at 640, 487 F. Supp. at 1379. Because of the remand by the
court of appeals, the issue is again before the trial court, this time to address frontally
the establishment clause claim.
135. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 42.001-42.076 (Vernon 1980).
136. Child Placement Agency Licensing Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-7A-1 to
40-7A-8 (Supp. 1981).
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agencies operated by religious entities. Rather, the acts acknowledge
free exercise and establishment clause values and seek to accom-
modate them by placing directly in the statute a legislative "codifica-
tion" of how the state's interest in the health and welfare of children
within its borders is limited by religious concerns.
The Texas statute deals with children's group-care homes, child
day-care centers, foster homes, and child agencies for foster home and
adoptive home placement."7 The purpose of the act, which embodies
language protecting religious ministries in the child-care business, is
set forth as follows:
The purpose of this chapter is to protect the health,
safety, and well-being of the children of the state who reside
in child-care facilities by establishing statewide minimum
standards for their safety and protection and by regulating
the facilities through a licensing program. It is the policy of
the state to ensure the protection of all children under care
in child-care facilities and to encourage and assist in the im-
provement of child-care programs. It is also the intent of the
legislature that freedom of religion of all citizens is invio-
late, and nothing in this chapter gives a governmental agen-
cy authority to regulate, control, supervise, or in any way be
involved in the form, manner, or content of religious instruc-
tion or the curriculum of a school sponsored by a religious
organization.'38
The language places a limit on the scope of any regulations promul-
gated under the act by the Department of Human Resources. More-
over, by distinguishing the regulatory mandate as being in the area of
"safety and protection,'! but not "religious instruction," at a religious
facility, the act clearly steers away from all regulations involving pro-
gram and personnel. Any regulation that sought involvement in pro-
gram or personnel of religious organizations would exceed the depart-
ment's statutory authority. This language was cited in Roloff
Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas"9 and Oxford v. Hill"' in sup-
port of the court's conclusions that the act did not unduly burden free
exercise concerns.
The recently-enacted New Mexico Child Placement Agency
137. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 42.002 (Vernon 1980).
138. Id. at § 42.001. This limit on regulatory power is repeated in § 42.042 (K).
139. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 26-35
supra.
140. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 27, 36
supra.
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Licensing Act,' provides for the licensing and regulation of agencies
involved in foster home and adoptive home placement. Section 40-
7A-4 E limits the regulatory authority of the Human Services De-
partment by the following language:
The regulations shall not proscribe or interfere with
the religious beliefs or religious training of child placement
agencies and foster homes, except when the beliefs or train-
ing endanger the child's health or safety.'42
Potential problems with the Texas and New Mexico models are
twofold. First, the approach leaves to a government agency, in the first
instance, to decide where "health and safety" ends and "religious
training and instruction" begins. Given the tendency of officials to ex-
pand their jurisdiction to the very limits of delegated authority, there
is a danger that the legislative intent will be frustrated by overzealous
civil servants.' The religious child-care organization may resort,
however, to judicial relief on a claim that the department has exceeded
its statutory authority. This is an easier claim to establish than one
under the religion clauses of the first amendment.
Second, the Texas and New Mexico models fail to accommodate
religious groups who object in principle to a church or parachurch
group having to license one of their ministries. The compulsion of re-
quiring a piece of paper entitled "LICENSE," without more, it is
argued, suggests an inferior position vis-a-vis the state and imper-
missibly burdens religious activity.'"
One pragmatic consideration favors the approach of the Texas
and New Mexico statutes. The legislation in these two states passed
with relative ease, whereas massive lobbying efforts by evangelical
and fundamentalist Christian groups were required to enact over stiff
opposition the Indiana, Virginia, Louisiana and Alabama legislation.
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7A-1 to 40-7A-8 (Supp. 1981).
142. Section 40-7A-4 D(1) of the act limits the scope of the department's
regulatory authority to the "shelter, health, diet, safety and education of the child
served."
143. On occasion the actions of these civil servants is in bad faith, but general-
ly not. It is more often the result of their training and focus being in the field of child
care, and their having little or no understanding of religious organizations or sensitivi-
ty to religious concerns. Additionally, overregulation is often due to the unwarranted
assumption by bureaucrats that they, not the private sector, are the "experts" and
know what is "best."
144. This argument was rejected in Roloff, Oxford, and Fayetteville, see text
accompanying note 50 supra, but affirmed in Corpus Christi, see text accompanying
notes 37-39 supra. The contention is discussed at text accompanying note 20 supra and
notes 170-74, 258-59 infra.
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III. THE ISSUES IN A FIRST AMENDMENT CONTEXT
Within the framework of our constitutional jurisprudence, the
issues of state regulation noted above are dealt with by the courts
under the following legal theories: (1) do the statutes and underlying
regulations violate the free exercise clause because they require the
religious organizations and their employees to subordinate their
beliefs to civil authority; (2) do the statutes and underlying regulations
have the primary effect of inhibiting religion and fostering excessive
government entanglement with religion contrary to the establishment
clause; (3) do some of the regulations involve civil authorities, and
eventually the courts, in ecclesiastical intrachurch disputes; and (4) do
the statutes and underlying regulations violate parental rights or con-
cerns of privacy?
A. What is "Religion"?
A question that crops up throughout this subject is the meaning
of "religion." As previously noted,14 if the state can successfully
categorize the activity in question as being exercised by an organi-
zation that is not a "church" or "religious" organization, or, although be-
ing carried out by a religious organization, as "secular" rather than
"spiritual" in nature, then first amendment protections have been cir-
cumvented.146
The courts have long struggled with this definitional problem.
More traditional perceptions of religion being grounded in theism '
have given way to the pluralistic view found in United States v.
Seeger' that the faith be "sincere religious beliefs which are based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate
or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court has been careful not to erase this thres-
hold determination altogether. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 49 it
scrutinized the record on appeal to insure that the exemption re-
145. See text accompanying notes 4-6, 71 supr.
146. The trend to classify the regulated activity as "secular," thus obviating
first amendment problems, is most disturbing to social and human services ministries.
In large part this happens because the establishment clause analysis requires a deter-
mination of whether an organization is pervasively religious. See text accompanying
notes 209-16 infra.
147. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890.
148. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
149. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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quested was not merely culturally or philosophically based.15 Growing
governmental involvement and increasing pluralism in the nation's
view of religion has engendered a theory of a variable definition of
"religion" in the free exercise and establishment clauses. 5'
B. Free Exercise Clause
Case law has long distinguished between the absolute freedom to
hold religious beliefs from the freedom to act upon religious beliefs,
the latter freedom being subject in some circumstances to curtailment
for the protection of societal interests.' The test for determining
when a governmental restraint has unduly burdened religious activity
was established by Sherbert v. Verner.' In Sherbert the Supreme
Court held that a Seventh-Day Adventist who was unwilling to accept
a job that required some work on Saturday could not be denied state
unemployment compensation. The Court quoted Braunfeld v. Brown'54
for the rule that: "[I]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously be-
tween religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect."'5 The Court fur-
ther indicated that if governmental action was to be upheld:
[I]t must be either because . . .[it] represents no infringe-
ment by the State of [the] constitutional rights of free exer-
cise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise
of... religion may be justified by a "compelling state inter-
est in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitu-
tional power to regulate .... "1
150. Id. at 215-16. Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 49 U.S.L.W. 4341, 4343 (Apr. 6, 1981), where the Supreme Court indi-
cated that where possible the "difficult and delicate task" of determining what is a
religious belief or practice should be avoided by the courts. Further, the Court said
that the resolution of what is religious "is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the
particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection."
151. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as TRIBE]; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056
(1978).
152. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (unreasonable re-
straint on religious solicitation).
153. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
154. 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
155. 374 U.S. at 404.
156. Id. at 403, quoting, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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The compelling state interest and the accompanying power to regulate
must arise from some substantial threat to public health, safety, peace,
or order. '
To meet the first part of the Sherbert test, it is incumbent upon
the church or religious organization to establish an adeuqate factual
record proving the sincerity and centrality of the religious beliefs that
are allegedly burdened." The twin inquiries of sincerity and centrality
present difficult factual determinations, the resolution of which
threaten separation of church and state. How does one prove the sin-
cerity of a religious belief? The individual cannot be put to the burden
of proving the truth of the belief: "Men may believe what they cannot
prove.' '5 9 Nevertheless, some objective evidence is required lest a
157. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29, 235-36 (1972); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
158. TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 14-11. For discussion of the sincerity and cen-
trality concepts see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
159. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court in Ballard sounded a ringing tribute to freedom of thought:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in
a society of free men. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. It em-
braces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doc-
trines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some
may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond
the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before
the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would
hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with
the duty of determining whether those teachings contained false
representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of
Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious con-
victions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile en-
vironment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of
religious freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of
the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of
disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on
which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government
which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the
right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of
his religious views. The religious views espoused by respondents might
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doc-
trines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any
sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain. The First Amendment does not select any one group or any one
type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.
Esbeck: State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
36 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
claim of freedom of religion become a ready excuse for avoiding many
unwanted legal obligations.'60
The concept of centrality deals with the importance a particular
faith places on a given activity.6 ' An examination of church documents
and traditions is a helpful starting point.' However, those factors can-
not be determinative or less traditional religions will remain unpro-
tected. '63 On the other hand, if religion is left wholly free to define its
own boundaries, some might seek exemption from all civil obligations
by maintaining that activity central to their faith was inseparably in-
terwoven with all of life's activity.'64
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105. As stated in Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342, "With man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he
may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be
made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be per-
mitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace
and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with."
160. See TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 14-11.
161. There has been debate among students of the Religion Clauses whether
proof of centrality is required at all to avail oneself of free exercise clause protection.
Those who have argued that centrality is not required are buoyed by the recent
Supreme Court decision of Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 49 U.S.L.W. 4341 (Apr. 6, 1981). In Thomas a Jehovah's Witness had
refused out of religious conviction to work on tank turrets because they were in-
struments of war. The Court brushed aside testimony in the record that other
Jehovah's Witnesses had no problem being so employed with these words:
Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a
particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill-equipped to
resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of
course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in
motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guarantee of free exercise is
not limited to beliefs which are shared by all the members of a religious
sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial func-
tion and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his
fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common
faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
450 U.S. at 715, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4343. Read literally the Court is saying that only the
religiously bizarre is without protection under the free exercise clause.
162. See TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 14-11.
163. The great danger to religious freedom of only affording protection to writ-
ten "canons" or "tenets" of a religion, or "activity that lies at the core of religious
practice, second only to worship itself' is explained in Ball, What Is Religion?, 8 THE
CHRISTIAN LAWYER 7 (1979).
164. Tests of centrality, overly restrictive for universal application, are the
findings in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), that not working on Saturday
is "a cardinal principle of her religious faith," and in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
218 (1972), that compulsory school attendance was "at odds with fundamental tenets of
their religious beliefs."
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Once an infringement of free exercise has been shown, the in-
quiry shifts to the second part of the Sherbert test wherein the state
must demonstrate a compelling interest in the regulation. Moreover,
the regulated conduct must pose "some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order. 16 "It is basic that no showing merely of a ra-
tional relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion.' "106 Finally, the regulatory means utilized by the state must be
the least restrictive to achieve a compelling end." 7
Returning to the battery of regulations'68 which states typically
impose on social services ministries of religious organizations, each
will be examined in light of the free exercise concepts of sincerity, cen-
trality, compelling state interest and least restrictive means.
1. Sincerity and Centrality.
Assuming that a bona fide religious organization is involved,'69
the most difficult hurdle for a church or parachurch ministry is
demonstrating that the religious conduct involved is central to the
faith and sincerely held. Consider, for example, the church day-care
centers in North Carolina v. Fayetteville Street Christian School.'0
The appellate court noted that all of the churches had previously ob-
tained licenses from the state but had let them expire. 7 ' From this fact
alone the court concluded "that all of the defendants have heretofore
been licensed by the Commission without any objections; and [there-
165. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), citing as examples, Cleveland
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (criminal prosecution of Morman for transporting a
woman across state lines for polygamous practices); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (criminal prosecution for violation of child-labor laws); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (criminal prosecution for refusal to obtain smallpox
vaccination); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (criminal prosecution of a
Mormon for polygamy).
166. 374 U.S. at 406, quoting, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)
(regulation of labor union activities struck down in face of free speech andassembly
challenge).
167. "[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights." Id., 374 U.S. at 407. See TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 14-10, pp.
846-59.
168. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 145-51 supra.
170. 42 N.C. App. 665, 258 S.E.2d 459 (1979). See text accompanying notes
40-50 supra.
171. Id. at 666, 258 S.E.2d at 460-62.
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fore failed to] show that it is contrary to their sincere religious belief to
seek licenses.""' In the view of the Fayetteville court, the church's
"new found" belief compelling them to open day-care centers was
given the same credibility as a prisoner's professed "jail-house
religion." The failure to prove that a belief was central to the religious
practices of the operators of the children's homes was also at work in
Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas' and Oxford v. Hill.'74
The children's home in Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Conrad'
cleared the sincerity and centrality tests presumably by testimony or
examination of church documents. The court found as a fact that:
Plaintiff's beliefs are based upon fundamentalist [Baptist]
principles. Among these principles is a firmly held convic-
tion that the church is obligated to provide care and susten-
ance to deprived children. An integral part of this perceived
obligation is that those children should receive fundamental-
ist training and discipline.'
Accordingly, the court was impressed with the claim that the
vagueness of the South Carolina legislation and regulations could be
applied to oppress the operation of the children's home and frustrate
religious training. Propogating the fundamentalist Baptist faith to
children was found to be central,' as indeed propogation of the faith to
children is central to most religions.
An examination of the regulations being resisted by some
religious ministries reveals few objections that burden specific
religious convictions that are centrally and sincerely held. For exam-
172. Id. at 670-71, 258 S.E.2d at 463.
173. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 26,
28-35 supra.
174. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 27, 36
supra.
175. C/A No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
176. Id., slip op. at 2. In granting the summary judgment motion of the church,
the court stated that the judgment was based on arguments presented at a hearing
and "other documents filed with this Court." Either testimony was allowed at the
hearing or documents were presented by affidavit or stipulation.
177. Id., slip op. at 6. The statutes and regulations found unconstitutional in
Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Conrad were so vague and poorly drafted that the possi-
ble breadth of their application permitted the court to imagine regulatory applications
and abuses that would burden religious conduct. Thus, without any showing that these
abuses had actually taken place, the court found in favor of the church. The case is
best seen as being grounded in the free exercise requirement that the least restrictive
means be utilized to achieve a compelling end.
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ple, requiring professional staff,"8 the keeping of orderly financial
records which are available for auditing in certain limited instances,'79
and compliance with more stringent fire and building codes for church
facilities utilized as day-care centers during the week 8 ' would be sur-
prising subjects of opposition to centrally held religious beliefs. A
long-standing principle of strict separatism from the affairs of the
world has not been found specific and central enough to occasion pro-
tection under free exercise analysis.''
178. Consider the related litigation involving state accreditation and regulation
of primary and secondary religious schools. In North Dakota v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d
883 (N.D. 1980), the court upheld the conviction of parents for failing to send their
children to state accredited schools in compliance with state compulsory-attendance
laws. The parents had been sending the children to a school associated with their
church, Bible Baptist School, that was not state approved. The court found the
religious beliefs and actions of the parents "inseparable and interdependent," and thus
sincerely held. Id. at 891. However, the required certification of teachers in sectarian
schools was held to be a matter in which the state had a compelling interest, id. at 893,
and not contrary to the parent's religious beliefs. Id. at 892.
The opinion in North Dakota v. Shaver was noted with approval in Nagle v.
Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). Accord, Nebraska ex rel Douglas v.
Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, - U.S. __ No.
80-1837, 50 U.S.L.W. 3243 (1981). See also Board of Educ. v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 245-46
(1968) (footnote omitted), wherein the Supreme Court observed that "a substantial
body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at
private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions
which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and
cover prescribed subjects of instruction."
By recent legislation, the state of North Carolina no longer requires state cer-
tified teachers in sectarian schools. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-257.6 to 115-257.13. For
discussion of merits of the legislation, compare Note, State Regulation of Private
Religious Schools in North Carolina-A Model Approach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
405 (1980) with Comment, The State and Sectarian Education Regulation To
Deregulation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 801.
179. A broader requirement of periodic audits available to the state upon re-
quest was objected to in Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244, 250, 607 P.2d
1102, 1107 (1980), because of the religious belief that "God will provide." The court
never challenged the belief, but accepted the finding at trial that Reverend Cowell's
convictions were sincerely held and practiced. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
180. The more stringent safety, fire, and building code requirements are large-
ly justified by the increased usage and traffic occasioned by heavy use of the church
facilities throughout the week, rather than only for worship services a few hours each
weekend. Cf. State Fire MiFrhall v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829, 300 N.W.2d 748 (1980),
discussed at note 15 supra.
181. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 20, 50, 144 supra. However, separatist
religious beliefs prevailed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Ohio v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). The successes in Yoder and
Whisner were achieved in large part due to counsel's careful and extensive develop-
ment of a factual record at trial.
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Other regulations, however, directly and substantially contradict
commonly recognized and long held religious tenets, for example, the
requirements of liability insurance; non-discrimination on a religious
basis in the selection of those served by the ministry;182 a governing
board representative of the community;183 case records open to the
state without parental permission; 84 and state-mandated procedures
for, and involvement in, grievances by members of the church or or-
ganization providing the ministry.185 Although these objections prob-
ably would afford religious exemptions from the specific regulations
involved, nonetheless they would not afford an exemption from state
licensing and regulation altogether. Only where the regulatory scheme
became "so persuasive and all-encompassing that total compliance
with each and every standard . . . would effectively eradicate" ' the
distinctive religious character and purpose of the social ministry,
would the religious beliefs be frontally impaired, violating free exer-
cise values.
. Compelling Interest and Least Restrictive Means.
The free exercise analysis next focuses on the state's burden to
prove a compelling interest in the matter it seeks to regulate and to
show. that it has done so by the least restrictive means. It is far too late
to deny that the state has a substantial, even vital interest in the
young, the poor, the helpless, and others more subject to the whims of
fate. Few would deny that many of the communities served by social
182. But see Scott v. Family Ministries, 65 Cal. App. 3d 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430
(1976), discussed at text accompanying notes 94-104 supra.
183. This requirement was objected to in Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227
Kan. 244, 249, 607 P.2d 1102, 1106 (1980). The Kansas regulation stated that the gover-
ning board must have at least six members representing a variety of community in-
terests.
Often a social ministry's board is also the church council, board of deacons or
elders of the sponsoring church. State involvement with the makeup of church gover-
nance bristles with impairment of theological convictions and practices.
184. The religious conviction is spawned by a belief that the parents direct the
religious upbringing of the child. As to parental rights theories see text accompanying
notes 240-51 infra.
185. The religious conviction finds legal expression in the prohibition against
the involvement of civil authorities in ecclesiastical disputes. See text accompanying
notes 230-39 infra.
186. Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 211, 351 N.E.2d 750, 768 (1976).
Whisner held that the minimum standards for private elementary schools, compliance
being a requisite for issuance of a state charter, were of such an extensive and com-
prehensive nature that forced adherence to the "minimum standards" infringed the
parental right to exercise freely their beliefs and to direct the religious upbringing of
their children by sending them to a sectarian school.
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and human services ministries are also proper subjects of the state's
protection. Consider, for example, young children ' in day-care
centers, orphans, foster children, alcoholics and drug addicts, expect-
ant unwed mothers and their newborns, those in need of medical care
or hospitalization, the elderly and invalids, the retarded or mentally ill,
and criminal offenders seeking rehabilitation.'88
The need for state protection of other communities served by
social and human services ministries is not nearly so established or ob-
viously compelling. Consider, for example, youth recreational pro-
grams; camps and adult retreat centers; ' counseling services; and
charities offering storehouses of food and used household goods,
monetary assistance, and temporary meals and lodging.9 ' Any given
case will turn on the particular facts and circumstances involved.
However, this latter list of social ministries certainly presents a less
compelling case for justification of a comprehensive and persuasive
state regulatory scheme, including mandatory licensing or certifica-
tion.
187. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which upheld child-labor
laws in the face of a challenge of free exercise and free speech by a Jehovah's
Witnesses parent.
188. In much the same manner the state's strong interest in the education of
children is well established. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Nebraska ex rel
Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 811, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579, cert. denied,
- U.S. _ No. 80-1837, 50 U.S.L.W. 3243 (1981); Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341,
352-53, 415 N.E.2d 279, 287 (1980); North Dakota v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 895-97
(N.D. 1980).
189. See note 110 supra. When members of Congress proposed to regulate
youth camps, including those operated by churches, the religious community was
aroused and handily defeated the proposed bill. Youth Camp Safety Act, S. 258, 95th
Cong., ist Sess. (1977). As proposed, the act would:
(1) Create a division of Youth Camp Safety within the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. The director of this division
would have the power to prepare and promulgate such standards and
regulations as would accomplish the purpose of making youth camps safe.
(2) This division (which would have $7.5 million appropriated to
run it the first year) would encourage states to pass their own laws and
resolutions, and to undertake their own regulation of youth camps within
their borders.
(3) Should the state choose not to enact a Youth Camp Safety
Law, the division would be empowered to come in and administer the
federal standards on its own. These powers include the power to set safe-
ty standards, relating to the choice of a camp director, camp counselors,
campsights and their environs and equipments.
The bill died largely because no one had demonstrated a clear need for the governmen-
tal oversight.
190. See note 105 supra.
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The courts in Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc.,'9' Oxford v.
Hill,92 and Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc.'93 had little trouble with the
state's assertion of a compelling interest in licensing children's homes
in order to protect the physical and mental well-being of the children
residing in such facilities. The state's interest in protecting the
"physical safety and moral environment" of young children left in day-
care centers was also found to be compelling in North Carolina v.
Fayetteville Street Christian School."'
More difficult to resolve is whether the state has achieved its in-
terests by the least restrictive means. It was this final facet of the free
exercise analysis that tipped the scales in favor of the church that
operated the children's home in Tabernacle Baptist Church v.
Conrad.'95 The federal district court distinguished the Roloff and
Fayetteville cases by noting that the Texas and North Carolina regula-
tions were directed only at "certain well-defined health and safety
standards."'96 In contrast, the licensing scheme in South Carolina was
"replete with broadly phrased provisions giving [the state] virtually
unlimited discretion" thus "fly[ing] in the face of [the church's]
religious beliefs."'97
Curiously, the court in Heart Ministries neglected to consider the
least restrictive means requirement in its free exercise analysis. 9
This is particularly disturbing because the regulations were so com-
prehensive and persuasive that the court declined even to labor to
summarize all of them.'99 In the court's muddled approach, seemingly
focused on free speech rather than free exercise values,"9 it was ap-
parently deemed sufficient to baldly assert that:
Absent the existence of licensing procedure, applicable to
sectarian and nonsectarial establishments alike, the State
191. 556 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes
26, 28-35 supra.
192. 558 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes
27, 36 supra.
193. 227 Kan. 244, 252-53, 607 P.2d 1102, 1108-09 (1980). See text accompanying
notes 52-74 supra.
194. 42 N.C. App. 665, 672, 258 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1979). See text accompanying
notes 40-50 supra.
195. C/A No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 1980).
196. Id., slip op. at 5.
197. Id., slip op. at 6.
198. 227 Kan. 244, 256-57, 607 P.2d 1102, 1111 (1980).
199. Id. at 248, 607 P.2d at 1106 ("The regulations, as would be expected, are
lengthy and quite detailed, and we will make no attempt to summarize all of them
here.").
200. Id. at 253-56, 607 P.2d at 1109-10.
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lacks essential knowledge required for the exercise of its
power and duty to protect children from physical and men-
tal harm. Absent licensing, the fire and safety regulations,
with which defendants are willing to comply, could not be ef-
fectively enforced and their purpose would be
compromised.201
No reasoning is tendered by the court to disclose why these vital
concerns cannot be met absent licensing. °2 Obviously they can be. Only
a little imaginative thought would have been necessary to see that the
models offered by the Indiana"0 3 and Virginia... child day-care acts
point the way toward limited intrusion into this sensitive constitu-
tional area, with the state's oversight in the health, fire, safety, and
child abuse matters retained and effectively enforced.
C. Establishment Clause
The establishment clause has been repeatedly construed by the
federal courts as ensuring what is popularly called "separation of
church and state." Chief Justice Burger has observed that:
[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment the "establishment" of a religion connotated
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity."5
The Court has not, however, held to the notion of an impregnable wall
of separation or strict neutrality between church and state. "Our prior
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state;
total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. . . . [T]he line of
separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship .'206
The tripartite test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman' 7 is the
starting point of establishment clause analysis:
201. Id. at 257, 607 P.2d at 1111-12.
202. Equally troubling was the court's suggestion that it should treat sectarian
and nonsectarian establishments alike. The United States Supreme Court has already
stated that in an appropriate free exercise case this "neutral" treatment is not permit-
ted. See note 13 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 111, 118, 120, 127-32 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 112, 118, 120, 127-32 supra.
205. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
206. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976).
207. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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1. The legislation and underlying regulations must have a
secular purpose;
2. The legislation and underlying regulations must neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion, thus having a neutral effect; and
3. The legislation and underlying regulations must not foster
excessive entanglement between government and religion by ongoing
and intrusive administrative relationships or by creation of political
divisiveness." 8
The first part of the Lemon test-secular purpose-is rarely at
issue when evaluating state licensing of social and human services
ministries of religious organizations because secular and sectarian
organizations are generally treated the same.
In consideration of the primary effect facet of the analysis, the
Supreme Court has offered a futher refinement of the factors to con-
sider. In Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,"°9 the court turned
back a challenge to the constitutionality of a state funding program
which afforded noncategorical grants to eligible colleges and univer-
sities, including sectarian institutions which awarded more than just
seminarian or theological degrees. In discussion focused on the foster-
ing of religion, but equally applicable to the inhibition of religion, the
Supreme Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what
private educational activities, by whatever procedure, may
be supported by state funds. Hunt [v. McNair10] requires (1)
that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so "per-
vasively sectarian" that secular activities cannot be
208. Id. See Ball, What is Religion?, 8 THE CHRISTIAN LAWYER 7, 12-13 (1979),
wherein the dubious origin of the "political divisiveness" facet of the entanglement
test is noted.
209. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
210. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). The challenged state aid in Hunt was for-the construc-
tion of secular college facilities, the plan being one of authority to issue state revenue
bonds. The Court upheld the legislation with this commentary on the primary effect
test:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive
that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting.
Ic. at 743. The college in Hunt, although subject to substantial control by its sponsor-
ing Baptist church, was nevertheless found not "pervasively sectarian." Id. at 743-45.
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separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activi-
ties can be separated out, they alone may be funded."'
As with the Baptist college in Hunt v. McNair,212 the Roman
Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to be "pervasively
religious." '13 The record supported findings that the institutions
employed chaplains who held worship services on campus, mandatory
religious classes were taught, some classes started with prayer, there
was a high degree of autonomy from the Roman Catholic church, facul-
ty were not hired on a religious basis and had complete academic
freedom except in religious classes, and students were chosen without
regard to their religion.
A comparison of Roemer and Hunt with the elementary and
secondary schools in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist " will
help to clarify the term "pervasively religious." The parochial schools
in Nyquist, found to be "pervasively religious," conformed to the
following profile: the schools placed religious restrictions on student
admissions and faculty appointments, they enforced obedience to reli-
gious dogma, they required attendance at religious services, they re-
quired religious or doctrinal study, the schools were an integral part of
the religious mission of the sponsoring church, they had religious in-
doctrination as a primary purpose, and they imposed religious restric-
tions on how and what the faculty could teach." 5
In determining what is "pervasively religious," it must be
remembered that some authorities suggest that "religion" as defined
for establishment clause purposes is considerably constricted from the
concept of "religion" in free exercise jurisprudence."' If this is a cor-
211. 426 U.S. at 755 (plurality opinion). For a comprehensive discussion of the
dangers inherent in civil authorities attempting to separate the "mostly religious"
from the "primarily secular," see Worthing, "'Religion" and "Religious Institutions"
Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313 (1980).
212. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). See note 210 supra.
213. 426 U.S. at 758 (plurality opinion).
214. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
215. Id. at 767-68.
216. See TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 14-6; Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
Consider, for example, the charitable solicitation ordinance struck down in
Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. filed, No. 80-1207, __ U.S. - ,
49 U.S.L.W. 3547 (1981), pursuant to a free exercise clause analysis. The ordinance had
classified the collection of money for religious purposes as solicitation for "evangelical
or missionary but not secular" ends. A secular purpose was said to be "not spiritual or
ecclesiastical, but rather relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing
food, clothing, and counseling." Thus, a church's program to solicit funds for the poor
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rect statement of the law, then the establishment clause is of dimin-
ished utility to religious organizations in holding at bay an increasing-
ly growing and affirmative state.
Evaluation of the final element of the analysis in Lemon requires
consideration of four subparts. Assessing the administrative entangle-
ment requires looking at:
(1) the character and purposes of the benefited [or inhibited]
institutions, (2) the nature of the aid [or state intrusion] pro-
vided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the State
and the religious authority.21
Assessing the fourth subpart, "[p]olitical fragmentation . . . on
religious lines,"2 8 dictates a look at whether the community served is
local or widely dispersed, the intrusion is primarily with religious
bodies or with those of no religious affiliation, and the degree of
autonomy from the sponsoring church.219
Before embarking on the entanglement analysis, the Court
warned:
There is no exact science in gauging the entanglement of
church and state. The wording of the test . . . itself makes
that clear. The relevant factors we have identified are to be
considered "cumulatively" in judging the degree of en-
tanglement.22
Apparently the church day-care centers in North Carolina v.
Fayetteville Street Christian School22 and the children's homes in
required a permit. The ordinance was deemed a religious test prohibited by Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
The broad definition of religion in Espinosa seems correct, certainly for free ex-
ercise purposes. It can readily be seen, however, why some have urged a narrower
definition for establishment clause use. With the increase of fraud and the spawning of
religious cults, some of which may abuse the body and the mind, a state left helpless to
initiate any involvement in that which is arguably religious is in no one's long term in-
terest.
217. 426 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615
(1971).
218. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
219. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66 (1976) (plurality opi-
nion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S 672, 688-89 (1971).
220. Id., 426 U.S. at 766.
221. 42 N.C. App. 665, 258 S.E.2d 459 (1979). See text accompanying notes
40-50 supra.
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Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas222 and Oxford v. Hill2 23
did not argue the establishment clause. As previously discussed, 24 the
federal district court summarily brushed aside the excessive entangle-
ment claim in Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Conrad.2 25 From all appear-
ances a genuine issue of fact was raised concerning excessive adminis-
trative entanglement with the local foster care review boards, thus,
rendering the grant of summary judgment in favor of the state er-
roneous.
Surprisingly, the religious ministry in Kansas v. Heart
Ministries, Inc. 2"6 neglected to assert establishment clause defenses as
well. Nevertheless, one comment by the court suggests that had the
"pervasively religious" issue been before it, the children's home
ministry would have been deemed primarily secular:
[Heart Ministries] is equating the operation of homes for
children, usually a secular activity, with the dissemination
of religious ideas. The teaching of religious doctrine to child-
ren simply cannot be equated with every aspect of the physi-
cal care of children on an around-the-clock basis for First
Amendment purposes." '
The court finding the children's home "secular" simply cannot be
reconciled with Roemer, Hart, and Nyquist. Comparing the relevant
elements as discussed by the Supreme Court with the institution in
Heart Ministries, clearly the entity established by Reverend and Mrs.
Cowell was "pervasively religious." There was religious restriction on
staff selection, enforced obedience to religious dogma, required attend-
ance at worship services, and required religious or doctrinal study.
Further, the children's home was an integral part of the religious mis-
sion of the sponsors, and religious evangelization was a primary pur-
pose of the home, although there were no religious restrictions on the
admission of the children.2 8
222. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 26,
28-35 supra.
223. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 27, 36
supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
225. C/A No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 1980).
226. 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102 (1980). See text accompanying notes 52-74
supra.
227. Id. at 256, 607 P.2d at 1111.
228. Id. at 245-50, 607 P.2d at 1104-07. Presumably there was no indicated
religious restriction on the admission of the children because once in the home the
staff sought to convert them to fundamentalist Christianity.
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The court in Heart Ministries incorrectly assumed that the pro-
tected exercise of religion is no broader than activities usually
religious in nature. Because the ministry functioned as a children's
home, a service that has both public and private nonsectarian counter-
parts in society, it was to this court "usually secular." Simply because
a majority of children's homes are operated by nonsectarian organiza-
tions does not make Reverend Cowell's work nonreligious. Proper es-
tablishment clause analysis steers a court not to organizational struc-
ture, nor to whether it has secular counterparts in society, but rather
to the nature, character, and underlying purposes of the entity.
A finding that the children's home in Heart Ministries was "per-
vasively religious" would not have precluded state regulation
altogether. It would have required, however, that the State of Kansas
be less intrusive in its oversight. This, of course, leads to the entangle-
ment facet of the Lemon test. Given the character and purpose of
Reverend Cowell's ministry, the extensive nature of the state's regula-
tion, and the resulting relationship of continuous state surveillance,
the Kansas regulatory scheme should have been found unconstitu-
tional as applied to the children's home. However, less intrusive
regulations pertaining to fire, health, and safety inspections; required
professional certification of staff; and minimum educational, medical,
and nutritional standards would withstand establishment clause ana-
lysis.29
D. Civil Involvement in Ecclesiastical Disputes
Certain state regulations of social and human services ministries
of religious organizations may impermissibly interfere with intra-
church discipline or disputes. This may occur in: (1) disputes concern-
ing the terms and conditions of employment, including discrimination;
(2) the discipline or discharge of an employee; (3) the discipline of an in-
dividual served by the ministry, including suspension or withholding
of services to the individual; (4) complaints from members of the public
229. Cf. Nebraska ex rel Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301
N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, __ U.S. No. 80-1837, 50 U.S.L.W. 3243 (1981); North
Dakota v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). These cases uphold the authority of the
state to provide for licensing of sectarian schools in order to effectuate limited educa-
tional standards such as certification of teachers, offering courses in a prescribed
range of subjects, and compliance with all municipal and state health, fire and safety
laws. For an opposing view, see Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality
in Public School Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 2 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POLY 125, 193-95 (1979). Any overbearing state standards would, however, be imper-
missible. Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). See note 186
supra.
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concerning a ministry's refusal to admit them or otherwise offer its
services on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (5) disputes within the
governing board over the ministry's policies and direction.
It is not unusual for a church-operated day-care center or
children's home to be open only to families who are members of that
church. Such a restriction runs counter to state regulations that pro-
hibit discrimination on specified bases, including religion. In like man-
ner, most church-operated ministries employ workers on a religious
basis because they view them as lay ministers. Such workers are sub-
ject to church discipline and dismissal for violation of religious canons
or beliefs. Participation in the ministry, either as a worker or as one
served, is regarded as a privilege, not a right. The church must be free
to determine the scope of its ministry without state interference.
Upon receipt of a complaint from a private citizen or a parent con-
cerning a ministry, state regulations often mandate a grievance proce-
dure. If the complainant is a member of a church having its own inter-
nal government for dispute resolution, compliance with the state
grievance procedure may impermissibly interfere with religion by
subordinating matters of ecclesiastical cognizance to civil judgment.
Invoking the doctrine of civil nonintervention in church disputes,
the Supreme Court in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.3° re-
jected a defrocked bishop's objection to his ouster by the highest body
of the Serbian Orthodox Church and to reorganization of the Ameri-
can-Canadian diocese by this same tribunal. The Court stated that in-
quiry by civil authorities into ecclesiastical decisions was inconsistent
"with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept
the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of
hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. 231
In Milivojevich there was no dispute that the church involved
was other than a hierarchical church, and that the sole power to
remove clerics rested with the governing body that had decided the
bishop's case.232 Nor was there a question that the matter at issue was
a religious dispute of ecclesiastical concern.23 The Illinois Supreme
Court agreed with these conclusions, but the court decided in favor of
the defrocked bishop because, in its view, the church's adjudicatory
230. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
231. Id. at 713.
232. Id. at 715.
233. Id. at 709.
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procedures had been applied in an arbitrary manner.234 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court rejected the "arbitrariness" exception
to the rule of nonintervention in religious disputes.23
The Supreme Court also reversed the state court's disapproval of
the diocesan reorganization, holding that the Illinois court's opinion
had impermissibly relied on its "delv[ing] into the various church con-
stitutional provisions" relevant to "a matter of internal church govern-
ment, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs." '236 The enforcement
of the provisions in controlling church documents could not be accom-
plished "without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible
inquiry into church polity.""23
The opinion in Milivojevich leaves several questions unanswered.
Does the rule of noninterference apply only to a hierarchical church?
Does it apply only to a church, and not to a parachurch or lay religious
organization? Does it apply only to matters where clerics are con-
cerned, or, also to disputes involving lay religious employees or church
members? How does one distinguish matters of "secular" concern to
the state from the religious topics of "discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law"?
Proper application of the noninterference rule in Milivojevich re-
quires a return to the analysis of more general application under the
free exercise clause.3 8 However, clearly older, more established
religions would be favored if Milivojevich applied only to hierarchical
churches. Moreover, serious free exercise questions are involved when
civil authorities are given the task of deciding who is a "cleric" and
who is a "lay employee" more subject to state regulation.239
E. Parental Rights
Where those served by a religious ministry are children, and
those children are placed in the care or custody of the religious
234. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477, 328
N.E.2d 268, 281-82 (1975).
235. 426 U.S. at 713. The "arbitrariness" exception had been established in dic-
tum in Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 18 (1929).
236. Id., 426 U.S. at 721.
237. Id. at 723.
238. See text accompanying notes 152-67 supra.
239. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), wherein the
Supreme Court acknowledged the role of parochial school teachers as lay religious
ministers. Accordingly, subjecting the employment relationship of parochial school
teachers to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act would "give rise to
serious constitutional questions." Id. at 501.
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organization by the parent or guardian, the concept of parental rights
may come into play. Common examples are church camps, day-care
centers, and children's homes.
In the course of resisting state regulation and licensing schemes,
the religious organization often will assert the defense that having
been delegated certain authority by the parents, it must defer to the
primary rights of the parents rather than the regulatory dictates of
the state. A recent example of this defense may be found in Kansas v.
Heart Ministries, Inc."° where Reverend Cowell refused to permit the
state to inspect the case records of children in his care without the per-
mission of the parents.241
The concept of parental rights draws from' and doctrinally
depends upon the more established principles of free exercise,
freedom of association, due process, and equal protection. The counter-
vailing doctrine is the plenary police power of the state as parens
patriae. In the context of the subject of this article, parental rights are
often considered in conjunction with free exercise analysis. According-
ly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,24 a state law forbidding the teaching in
public or private schools of any modern language other than English to
any child who had not passed the eighth grade was found to be con-
trary to substantive due process rights. In reversing the conviction of
a parochial school instructor, the Court said:
Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty
of the parent to give his children education suitable to their
station in life ....
. . . [The instructor's] right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we
think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment.24
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters244 a state com-
pulsory education act requiring children to attend a public rather than
parochial school was held to be an unreasonable interference with the
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, and thus
240. 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102 (1980).
241. Id. at 250, 607 P.2d at 1107. Reverend Cowell testified that compliance
with the state's requirement to keep records on each child and to disclose them to the
state, would be a "breach of ethics of his Christian ministry."
242. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
243. Id. at 400.
244. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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contrary to substantive due process concerns. In an often quoted
passage, the Supreme Court said:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions.245
In Griswold v. Connecticut,24 the Supreme Court spoke of Pierce
as resting on the first amendment. Later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,247 the
Court referred to Pierce as "a charter of the rights of parents to direct
the religious upbringing of their children." A still later decision men-
tioned "the right to choose nonpublic over public education" in Pierce
as an aspect of free exercise.248 Thus, subsequent cases have brought
the holding of Pierce within the free exercise rights of the first amend-
ment.
Although religious ministries resisting state regulation do not
have standing to assert the rights of parents leaving children in their
charge, parents are often joined as parties for strategic reasons.249
When joinder is accomplished, the rights of the parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children may be central. Consider the
case of Michigan v. Nobel"' involving the related area of state regula-
tion of education. In Nobel, parents who refused to send their children
to public school or a private school outside their home were charged
with violating a state compulsory education law. The court held that
the state statutes must give way to the documented and sincere reli-
gious beliefs of the parents regarding the education of their children.
The parents prevailed in Nobel notwithstanding the state's strong in-
245. Id. at 535.
246. 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
247. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
248. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
249. See, e.g., Texas v. Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church, Cause No. 297,
248 (200th Jud'l D. Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. Jun. 30, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 13,575
(Tex. Civ. App. Sep. 4, 1981); Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church v. Texas Dept. of
Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1979). For like reasons the
employees of religious ministries may seek intervention in order to argue their right
to freely exercise their religious calling unhindered by the state.
250. Nos. S-791-0114-A and S-791-0115-A (57th D. Ct. for the City of Allegan,
Mich. Dec. 12, 1979). See also Nebraska v. Rice, 204 Neb. 732, 285 N.W.2d 223 (1979).
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terest in education, in contrast to recent cases elsewhere upholding
compulsory attendance laws challenged by unlicensed church
schools. 5
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
There is some evidence of judicial deference to the bureaucratic
assumptions of a social science "elite" that the program and personnel
of religious service organizations no longer enjoy the traditional ram-
part of freedom that normally accompanies religious action."5 ' How-
ever, because so few cases have been decided after full trial on the
merits, insufficient returns are available to suggest a trend.2 53
Where a "substantial threat to public safety, peace or order""2 4 is
implicated, the state can and should monitor the activity involved. The
battle is not over whether the state has a regulatory interest, for it
clearly does, but over the nature and degree of that involvement. The
legislation in Indiana, Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, and South Caro-
lina255 suggests an approach that accommodates both legitimate state
concerns and the values undergirding the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses. Legislation satisfies the state's compelling interests in
health, fire, and safety by permitting exempt religious organizations
to comply as follows:
1. The organization must give periodic written notice to the
state that it is in operation, including addresses of all places of
business, telephone numbers, officials in charge, sponsoring church or
religious group, and copies of incorporation or organizational papers.
This notice or registration is necessary for the state to be adequately
informed and to properly exercise its interests.2 51
251. See notes 178, 229 supra.
252. See, e.g., Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102
(1980).
253. Roloff, Oxford, Fayetteville, and Tabernacle Baptist Church were all
decided on pretrial motions. The outcome may well have been different had the courts
had a fully developed factual record. Fayetteville and Emmanuel Baptist Preschool
are presently before courts of original jurisdiction for trial on the merits. See note 29
and text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. Corpus Christi is on appeal following a full
trial. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
254. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972).
255. See text accompanying notes 111-15, 118-34 supra.
256. Although registration is a prior restraint on religious exercise, it is slight.
Moreover, the restraint is justified by the state's compelling interest in the fire,
health, and safety area. No matter how extreme one's separatist views on church and
state, they must give way to this proper but limited role of the state protecting its
citizens.
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2. The organization must submit to inspection by appropriate,
local or state fire, health, and safety officials, and file with the state
certificates of compliance. The inspection codes should be reasonable
and no more stringent than those applicable to the organization's
secular counterparts.
3. The organization must post a notice concerning its exempt
status in a conspicuous place and furnish written notice thereof to
those its serves. Additional information on facilities, policies, govern-
ing board, and staffing must be available upon request. The notices
shall give a government address and telephone number to contact in
the event an individual has questions of the state or desires to file a
complaint. This requirement follows the practice of consumer-oriented
legislation which requires the disclosure of sufficient information to
enable a potential customer to make an informed and deliberate choice.
4. Upon receipt of a sworn written complaint from a member of
the public, the state may inspect for violations of fire, health, and safe-
ty codes and for physical abuse. The state shall submit the sworn com-
plaint to the appropriate local or state official for investigation and, if
appropriate, prosecution. For example, allegations of child abuse
would be submitted to the local district attorney and fire code viola-
tions to the municipal fire marshall.
5. When appropriate, certain minimum standards for health and
safety should be written into the legislation. For example, a minimum
ratio of employees to number of children in a day-care center.257
6. The organization will be issued a letter of compliance certify-
ing that the appropriate registration form and other documents have
been filed with the state. Only a letter of compliance is issued, not a
state license." 8 A license is not required because it implies to some that
257. Minimum standards in the statutes rather than in regulations afford an
additional degree of insulation from state entanglement. Regulations are more subject
to amendment and reinterpretation than is a statute. Moreover, under this suggested
approach the statute is enforced, if violated, by a court. This results in a limited intru-
sion by civil authorities, as opposed to a continued organic relationship with an ad-
ministrative body.
258. "License" is defined as a "right or permission granted in accordance with
law by a competent authority to engage in some business or occupation, to do some
act, or to engage in some transaction which but for such license would be unlawful."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED, 1304 (1976). Thus, licensing certain religious activity does indeed imply
that the state has the power to prohibit engaging in the religious activity altogether.
Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (municipality may not impose a
license tax requirement on door-to-door distribution of religious literature). Whether a
state would ever attempt such a complete ban is at present only hypothetical.
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the ministry must have the permission of the state to operate."9
7. Failure to comply with the registration requirenents of the
legislation is cause for the state to file an action in the local court of
general jurisdiction to enjoin its operation. Further, noncompliance is
a misdemeanor punishable in accord with local practice by fine or im-
prisonment.
8. The legislation shall not prevent the religious organization
from waiving the exemption, thus requiring that it be licensed by the
state upon compliance with the more extensive regulatory scheme of
the state applicable to secular organizations.
Perhaps the most difficult question to resolve is how to define
those "religious" organizations to which the exemption applies. As
previously noted, reference to section 501(c) (3) status in the Internal
Revenue Code is a legal cul-de-sac.26 Nor can newly formed churches or
religions be eliminated by exempting only established or orthodox
religious organizations. 61 Since the establishment clause test requires
that entanglement be avoided if an organization is "pervasively
religious," '262 and such an organization cannot receive public funding,
the better definition of an exempt organization is that applied in the
Louisiana legislation."3 The Louisiana statute exempts an organization
259. Notwithstanding extreme separatist views on church and state, the re-
quirement that a church or religious organization obtain a license to operate, without
more, has been found a sufficient burden on religious activity to violate the free exer-
cise clause only in Corpus Christi. See text accompanying notes 20, 50, 144, 170-74
supra. However, under this suggested approach only a letter of compliance is issued in
order to avoid impermissible administrative entanglement and political fragmentation
along religious lines.
Research studies have shown state licensing or permit schemes to be ineffec-
tual. Baron, Licensing: The Myth of Government Protection, 8 BARRISTER 46 (Winter
1981). Common defects in licensing regulation are: (1) in many instances permits are
issued almost automatically with little review of whether an applicant meets stated
qualifications; (2) standards frequently bear no relationship to legitimate government
interests, but rather are used to restrict competition; (3) the agencies charged with
responsibility devote the bulk of their resources to permit issuance and renewal, and
have little remaining time for monitoring and enforcement; and (4) violators are rarely
punished and licenses revoked. Id. at 48. Baron advocates an enforcement system
without licensing. Under such a system all standards for conduct within an industry
are set out in positive law. Violators receive sanctions, either civil or criminal depend-
ing on the severity of the public harm. The enforcement system would permit greater
resources devoted to monitoring and swift prosecution of violators.
260. See notes 120-21 supra.
261. For this reason the exemption language in the Alabama legislation is in-
adequate. See note 122 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 209-16 supra.
263. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
Esbeck: State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
56 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
"if it receives no state or federal funds."2"4 Any organization accepting
public funds, and thus not "pervasively religious," should have little
difficulty submitting to a comprehensive state licensing and regula-
tory scheme."' Of paramount concern, however, is avoiding where
possible state involvement in the sensitive and perilous task of
defining that which is and is not religious.26
The foregoing approach reconciles the regulatory concerns of the
welfare state with the pursuit of social justice by our still vital volun-
tary religious institutions. Thus, the approach evidences an application
of the classic liberal philosophy that views with suspicion and,
wherever possible, avoids government intervention.
264. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1404A(2) (West Supp. 1981).
265. This is not to say that individual regulations would not impermissibly of-
fend religious beliefs. Consider the examples of Roman Catholic hospitals and medical
schools that received public assistance but are exempt from performing abortions and
sterilizations. See note 109 supra.
266. See text accompanying notes 145-51 supra.
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